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A RAND NOTE

Polish Foreign Policy under a Non-Communist
Government: Prospects and Problems

Thomas S. Szayna

April 1990

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The research described in this report was cosponsored by the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy within RAND's National Defense Research Institute, a federally funded research and development center supported by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Contract No. MDA903-85-C-0030, and by the RAND/UCLA Center for Soviet Studies.

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N-3078-USDP/CSS

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Prepared for the
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

Accession For	
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DTIC TAB	<input type="checkbox"/>
Unannounced	<input type="checkbox"/>
Justification	
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91 6 14 045

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE (When Data Entered)

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE		READ INSTRUCTIONS BEFORE COMPLETING FORM
1. REPORT NUMBER N-3078-USDP/CSS	2. GOVT ACCESSION NO.	3. RECIPIENT'S CATALOG NUMBER
4. TITLE (and Subtitle) Polish Foreign Policy Under a Non-Communist Government: Prospects and Problems		5. TYPE OF REPORT & PERIOD COVERED interim
		6. PERFORMING ORG. REPORT NUMBER
7. AUTHOR(s) T. S. Szayna		8. CONTRACT OR GRANT NUMBER(s) MDA903-90-C-0004
9. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND ADDRESS RAND 1700 Main Street Santa Monica, CA 90401		10. PROGRAM ELEMENT, PROJECT, TASK AREA & WORK UNIT NUMBERS
11. CONTROLLING OFFICE NAME AND ADDRESS Under Secretary of Defense for Policy The Pentagon Washington, DC 20301		12. REPORT DATE April 1990
		13. NUMBER OF PAGES 58
14. MONITORING AGENCY NAME & ADDRESS (if different from Controlling Office)		15. SECURITY CLASS. (of this report) unclassified
		15a. DECLASSIFICATION/DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE
16. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of this Report) Approved for Public Release; Distribution Unlimited		
17. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of the abstract entered in Block 20, if different from Report) No Restrictions		
18. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES		
19. KEY WORDS (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number) Poland Government (foreign)		
20. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number) See reverse side		

This Note analyzes Polish foreign policy directions following the establishment of a government led by non-Communists. It is based both on trends within Polish opposition circles before the government was set up and on actions and foreign policy statements made as of December 1989 by government officials. It also surveys the international political situation in Poland in an attempt to judge support for new foreign policy moves. The author identifies three fundamental points that will guide Polish foreign policy: (1) full respect for sovereignty in Polish-Soviet relations; (2) an opening toward the West, especially toward the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany; and (3) emphasis on human rights and environmental concerns. He concludes that foreign policy will become an important issue, easily exploitable for domestic political purposes at a time of extreme economic readjustments that will produce quite a few losers as well as winners.

PREFACE

This Note analyzes Polish foreign policy directions following the establishment of a government led by non-Communists. It is based both on trends within Polish opposition circles before the government was set up and on actions and foreign policy statements made as of December 1989 by government officials. It also surveys the internal political situation in Poland in an attempt to judge support for new foreign policy moves. The author of the study is a consultant to The RAND Corporation.

This Note was prepared as part of a larger project describing Soviet dilemmas in Eastern Europe that was undertaken for the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy under RAND's National Defense Research Institute, a federally funded research and development center supported by the Office of the Secretary of Defense. It is part of RAND's International Security and Defense Policy Program. Some of the research was also supported by the RAND/UCLA Center for Soviet Studies. This Note should be of interest to policymakers and scholars concerned with Eastern Europe, East-West relations, and Soviet policy toward Eastern Europe.

SUMMARY

Poland has embarked fully on the road to a market economy and a liberal democracy. Although some form of a market economy is assured, a liberal democracy is not at all a certainty. The success of the Polish transition depends mainly on factors internal to Poland, but both the West and the USSR will play an important role in the outcome. The United States and the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) are two crucial sources of investment, technology, and political support. Soviet tolerance is also necessary for the success of the Polish transformation.

To avoid raising Soviet fears, the Poles will have to take into account Soviet strategic interests. Although a Soviet military intervention is no longer realistic, the Soviets still possess economic leverage over Poland that could be used to pressure the Polish government. For now, membership in the Warsaw Pact is the line the East Europeans (especially the Poles) are not supposed to cross. However, the current Soviet approach to Eastern Europe is internally contradictory; it is only a matter of time before this limitation too will be challenged. The task of Polish diplomats in the next few years will be to balance a shift toward the West, and especially the FRG, without raising Soviet security concerns. The relaxation of international tensions makes the problem easier; a multilateralization of Polish approaches toward the West lessens the problem but does not remove it.

A genuine consensus on foreign policy existed between the reformist Communists and the moderate opposition during their "roundtable" negotiations in the spring of 1989. Safeguarding the Polish evolution toward a market economy and a liberal democracy are the basic short-term goals of Solidarity, while neutrality and reintegration into the main body of Europe are the longer-term objectives. The Communist party no longer has an alternative to the former and does not object to the latter. Substantive and stylistic changes are taking

place in Polish foreign policy, though a sense of continuity remains. The attempt to strike a greater balance between Soviet-Polish and German-Polish relations is the most important change.

Three fundamental points will guide Polish foreign policy:

- Full respect for sovereignty in Polish-Soviet relations;
- An opening toward the West, especially toward the United States and the FRG;
- Emphasis on human rights and environmental concerns.

Poland's German policy is based on a new approach to the Polish dilemma (the problem of being located between two more powerful, antagonistic, and often aggressively disposed countries). The approach Poland tried before World War II--namely, refusing to align with either neighbor--ended in a catastrophe for the Poles. The approach after World War II--aligning with one neighbor against the other--led to dependency and Poland's removal from the main body of Europe. Instead of these approaches, the moderate opposition proposed a satisfactory solution for all three countries: **acquiescence to German reunification as the German threat is fully removed by the integration of Europe in 1992, combined with a cooperative attitude toward the USSR that takes into account Soviet interests in Poland.** The approach is based on the idea that a Polish move toward a liberal democracy cannot be separated from regionwide liberalization. This view of the indivisibility of reforms also led to Polish acceptance of reforms in the German Democratic Republic (GDR) as the liability of the existence of the GDR, a state dependent on the USSR for its survival, was recognized by the Poles. In relation to the USSR, **the changed nature of the Warsaw Pact, as well as Polish controls on any potential use of the Polish military, makes the organization an irrelevant shell with which the Poles are willing to put up.** Polish fears about the consequences of a crackdown in the USSR and the view that reforms must be regionwide mean that the Polish government actively supports further Soviet reforms.

The liberalization in Eastern Europe has vented nationalist feelings Communist regimes kept forcibly subdued. Polish nationalism, in some ways typical of East European nationalism, has several traits: xenophobia, historicism, arrogance toward other nationalities, messianism, attachment to Roman Catholicism, and the authoritarian flavor given to it by the National Democracy movement. Germans and Eastern Slavs are seen in highly negative terms in the Polish nationalistic outlook. The Communists strengthened Polish prejudice against the Germans by exaggerating German misdeeds toward the Poles and by reinventing various myths. As a result, a strong dislike exists among the Poles toward the Germans--a feeling reciprocated to a lesser extent by the Germans. Although the Communists tried to lessen the Polish prejudice against the Eastern Slavs, their efforts were largely unsuccessful. These biases at the popular level will exert a powerful influence on Polish foreign policy because the liberalization of political life in Poland gives these pent-up biases venues through which they can find expression. The mass-level feelings will limit the parameters within which the Polish elite will be able to pursue foreign policy goals.

Radical opposition groupings--consisting of nationalist organizations, militant anti-Walesa worker groups, and conservatives associated with the Church--distrust the coalition of moderate opposition groups clustered around Polish Solidarity leader Lech Walesa. The elections provide some evidence that the radical groupings are quite strong. An especially ominous sign is the radicalization of the youth. The choice of Tadeusz Mazowiecki as premier assuaged some of the differences between the radicals and the moderates, but the radicals are skeptical of the government and are positioning themselves for the government's fall, an event they consider inevitable.

The appeal of simplistic solutions propagated by populists is another problem for the Mazowiecki government. Some workers and the old-line Communists have coalesced around Alfred Miodowicz, the official unions' chief, whose demagogic appeals have had some effect.

In view of the widespread Polish fears of the Germans and the continuing Polish prejudice toward the Germans and the eastern Slavs, **Polish foreign policy toward the Germans and the USSR will be exploited for political purposes by groups opposed to the moderate, Walesa-led coalition.** The presence of an increasingly vocal German minority (that is difficult to define) in western Poland, the heightened anti-German bias in northwestern Poland (especially because of the Polish-GDR border dispute), and a history of militancy among the population of western Poland make the ex-German territories a fertile ground for nationalistic appeals based on opposition to Mazowiecki's foreign policy. The government's Soviet policy is less controversial but vulnerable to attack on the grounds of being too conciliatory. Externally, the Poles' agitation and support for reform in the USSR may become a problem in Polish-Soviet relations, especially as the Gorbachev leadership begins to impose limits on nationalistic demands in the Soviet republics.

Foreign policy will become an important issue, easily exploitable for political purposes at a time of extreme economic readjustments that will produce quite a few losers as well as winners. Although Polish foreign policy toward the Germans and the Soviets is well thought-out and would benefit the Polish economy, contribute to stability, and further Poland's political transformation, its implementation is far from certain. A liberal democracy with a stable market economy is a possible outcome of the Polish transition, but an unbalanced, rudimentary market economy with a chaotic democracy or a succession of civilian-military regimes is also possible.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to thank my RAND colleagues Ronald Asmus, Keith Crane, James F. Brown, Harry Gelman, and Larry Watts for insightful comments that greatly improved this study. I am also indebted to Karen Steinberg for expert editorial advice and to Carole Wood and Michael DiMaggio for secretarial services.

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I. INTRODUCTION

The change in Poland's socioeconomic system was internally motivated, caused by the past ten years' deteriorating economic situation and slowly crumbling regime. The ascent in the Soviet Union of General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev has allowed Poland to attempt a genuine solution to these problems. The thrust of Polish internal changes is clear: redemocratization and a market economy. Clearly the Polish transformation will have lessons for all Communist states. The foreign policy shifts that stem from Polish internal changes have great influence on Europe's military and political landscape.

That old conflicts have reemerged in a period of relaxation in international tensions and at a time of genuine sovereignty for Eastern Europe is ironic. In the Polish case, the dilemma of being located between two larger and more powerful countries--namely, Germany and the USSR--that have a history of attempting to dominate Poland has the potential to reemerge with a vengeance. The Polish contemporary problem is to balance the need for improvement in ties with the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) while not arousing Soviet security concerns.

In the 1980s, Polish opposition intellectuals worked out a blueprint for policies toward Germany and the USSR that took into account Poland's location and attempted a mutually agreeable solution. Based on this blueprint, Polish policy toward the USSR is fairly cautious. It recognizes the USSR's strength and interests in Poland. The policy toward the two German states is innovative. It focuses on establishing good relations with the FRG based on mutual trust. Polish policy is based on larger European trends and does not oppose the reunification of Germany.

As politics are rediscovered in Poland, the ghosts of the past (both the more distant past and the recent, Communist past), in terms of popular perceptions, have been playing a large role in deciding whether the government's foreign policy will end in failure or in success.

Failure in foreign policy will probably preclude successful redemocratization and will adversely affect the establishment of a functioning market economy in Poland. The fundamental question in this Note is, What are the most important forces that will influence the government's ability to implement its German and Soviet policies? A derivative question is, What is the relative strength of these forces? We will examine the potential internal sources of opposition to the foreign policy of Premier Tadeusz Mazowiecki's government as well as probable external problem areas, in an attempt to provide an assessment of the government's chances.

II. THE POLISH TRANSITION AND FOREIGN POLICY

THE TRANSITION

The establishment of a Polish government led by non-Communists in August 1989 marked a watershed in the evolution of Eastern Europe toward full independence from the USSR. For the first time, a ruling Communist party, not threatened by armed intervention from abroad, gave up power peacefully (though not without misgivings). The Polish change of government invalidated the previously ideologically based, historically determinist refusal to "abandon the gains of socialism" that, among other consequences, led to the Soviet military intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968. The dramatic change in Poland was the first real test of the genuineness of Soviet policy of noninterference in Eastern Europe. As the test was passed successfully, an avalanche of change began in Eastern Europe that quickly pushed the "limits of the permissible" far beyond what previously had been considered possible. Indeed, the opening of the floodgates began a trend toward a new, independent Eastern Europe shaped by indigenous forces.

Some skeptics may still question the completeness or permanence of the change in Poland by pointing out the continued Communist domination of the ministries in charge of the military and the police. Such a view is overly negative and denies the tremendous changes occurring in the country's internal organization as the economy is reprivatized and a civil society is allowed to organize along pluralistic rather than state corporatist lines. Reversing these changes has become virtually impossible. The Solidarity-controlled parliament is in charge of the apparatus of power and has established control over the instruments of coercion through personnel appointments, legislative action, and a closely supervised process of restructuring of the interior and defense ministries. Virtually all troop formations under the Ministry of the Interior's control will experience reductions. The formations used for riot control--Mechanized Units of People's Militia and Volunteer Reserves of People's Militia (better known as ZOMO and ORMO,

respectively)--have received special attention; they have been diminished or disbanded altogether. Many old-guard senior military officers have been retired. Cuts in the two ministries' budgets will further diminish the size and effectiveness of the police and the military for domestic coercive tasks. The departments within the Ministry of the Interior that were tasked with domestic intelligence and policing duties have been eliminated almost entirely, making the ministry unable to keep a check on any but fringe domestic political forces. The people in charge of the defense and interior ministries are reformist Communist party members; so far, their actions attest to their sincerity in supporting the transformation of Poland from a *polizeistaat* to a *rechstaat*. For example, Minister of the Interior Czeslaw Kiszczak was instrumental in bringing about the "roundtable" compromise in the spring of 1989 that led to the elections and Solidarity's accession to power, while a top Solidarity official, Bronislaw Geremek, acknowledged the military's constructive role in bringing about change by admitting that "the reformist current supported by the generals has prevailed in the party."¹ Since the change of governments in August 1989, other army and police spokesmen have constantly emphasized their acceptance of the change and their obedience to the parliament. Finally, the question also exists as to what an attempt at reversing the transformation would accomplish, since the previous style of governing in Poland was delegitimized by the social and economic problems it led to, while in the Soviet Union *perestroika* has officially declared the Soviet system's inefficiency.

Regardless of future developments, one thing seems clear: A market-based economic system will be instituted in Poland. Whether the economic transformation will be accompanied by a political transition to a full, functioning democracy remains uncertain. A redemocratization in Poland may be interrupted by periods of authoritarian rule (in a style

¹Interview with Geremek, *La Vanguardia*, July 5, 1989 (translated in *Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report, East Europe* [FBIS-EEU], No. 137, July 19, 1989, p. 44).

reminiscent of some Latin American countries), while a market economic system remains in place.

NECESSARY CONDITIONS FOR SUCCESS

The success of the Polish transformation--that is, the system's further evolution into a stable democracy--depends largely on solving the economic problems facing the country. To say how much time the Mazowiecki government has to show results by stabilizing the economic situation is difficult. Solidarity officials speak of having anywhere from four months to one year to show results before unrest threatens the whole endeavor. The one-year limit is a self-imposed time frame used for political purposes, and the Poles' tolerance for economic chaos should not be underestimated. Nevertheless, time is limited for the Mazowiecki government, for only overwhelming popular support will prevent the problems that will come with economic reorganization (unemployment, growing inequality) from threatening the government's viability. The Poles' ability to make reform work is crucial, but both the West and the USSR have influence over the course of the Polish reforms (although for different reasons).

THE SOVIET ROLE

The continued Soviet tolerance of the Polish transformation is a necessary prerequisite for the success of the Polish reforms. Although Soviet military intervention is no longer a realistic option, the USSR still possesses economic leverage over Poland that, in certain situations, could wreak havoc with Polish reforms and destabilize the country. The USSR has a vital geostrategic interest in Poland; because of its central location and its size, Poland has been the linchpin of Soviet influence over Eastern Europe and Europe as a whole.

Soviet domination over Eastern Europe has clearly weakened, if not evaporated altogether, during Gorbachev's tenure, especially during 1988-1989. The loss of Soviet leverage over Eastern Europe is related to Soviet internal reforms. However, Soviet political, economic, and security interests in Eastern Europe are state interests (independent of

party interests) that will remain, regardless of any internal transformations in the USSR. The change under Gorbachev has consisted of a fundamental shift in Soviet perceptions as to the ways of guaranteeing Soviet state interests in Eastern Europe. In admitting the failed model of Soviet socialism and the negative consequences of previous Soviet interference in Eastern Europe, the Soviets no longer identify the concept of security with ideology.² This change has allowed the process of indigenously derived political forces to emerge in the countries of Eastern Europe.

The Soviet Union's reconsideration of its relations with Eastern Europe has meant that old-style Soviet meddling in East European affairs is over. Nevertheless, the Soviets desire some form of Soviet-East European consensus on international issues because of basic security concerns. This consensus will probably emerge in the form of a changed, looser Warsaw Pact (or a successor organization) that will focus on foreign policy coordination in the security sphere. It will no longer be a tool through which East European military resources may be controlled by the USSR. Membership in the Warsaw Pact is the final sign of geopolitical loyalty, irrelevant to ideological (in the face of a deideologized Warsaw Pact) considerations. Given the specific ideological justification for setting up the Warsaw Pact in 1955 (the Pact was ostensibly set up as the political-military organization of the Socialist community in response to the FRG's rearmament), a deideologized Warsaw Pact may seem a contradiction in terms; however, the ideological justification was a facade, and geopolitical concerns, as well as post-Stalinist shifts in standards of political acceptability, dictated the joint body's formation. In addition, the Soviet Union's international status is at stake since the Soviet claim to be the leader of a major political-military alliance is a real component of state power in international politics. Lacking an alliance leadership position, the Soviet Union's international status as a state

²Ronald Asmus, "Evolution of Soviet-East European Relations Under Mikhail Gorbachev," *Radio Free Europe Research [RFE], Background Report*, No. 153, August 22, 1989.

is reduced to a level not far above China's. For now, Warsaw Pact membership seems to be a line East Europeans are not to cross. The Soviet government spokesman said as much in his news conference on November 9, 1989,³ though these "limits" had been communicated earlier to East Europeans and in more discreet circumstances. For example, Mikolaj Kozakiewicz, the Sejm (lower house in the Polish parliament) speaker, has said:

The Soviet ambassador called on me; I gathered from him that if they see no danger to this part of Europe, as far as they are concerned they will follow events and wish us luck. This, of course, as long as we remain loyal to the Warsaw Pact. The Soviets are watching us and testing our loyalty.⁴

The current Soviet approach to Eastern Europe is internally contradictory, for it simultaneously affirms no interference and posits a limit on East Europeans' autonomy in the international sphere. The approach is questionable on the grounds of feasibility (in view of only a loose congruence of strategic interests, if not a lack of interests, between the USSR and the East European countries), and is potentially damaging to the USSR (for political reasons, the USSR cannot enforce its self-declared limit if an East European country actually withdraws from the Pact). Thus, this last limitation on Eastern Europe is bound to be challenged too, though how soon is uncertain. In a seeming acknowledgment of this position's untenability, the Soviets have started to debate the future nature of the Warsaw Pact,⁵ and some of the most senior Soviet government spokesmen have declared that the East European states are free to withdraw from the Warsaw Pact.⁶ Indeed, the

³*Los Angeles Times*, November 10, 1989.

⁴Interview with Mikolaj Kozakiewicz, *Yedi'ot Aharonot*, August 22, 1989 (translated in *FBIS-EEU*, No. 167, August 30, 1989, p. 52).

⁵Mikhail Bezrukov and Andrei Kortunov, "What Kind of an Alliance Do We Need?" *New Times*, No. 41, 1989, pp. 7-9.

⁶For example, Marshal Sergei Akhromeyev said so during his trip to the United States in the summer of 1989. Vadim Zagladin, Gorbachev's advisor on foreign policy issues, hinted at this even earlier. See comments by Zagladin in *Sueddeutsche Zeitung*, April 26, 1989 (translated in *Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report, West Europe* [*FBIS:WEU*], No. 83, May 2, 1989, p. 10).

conflicting Soviet pronouncements (allowing the East Europeans to withdraw from the Pact in theory but warning them not to do so in practice) suggest that Soviet preemption of the Warsaw Pact's disintegration--by moving to dissolve the organization and possibly replace it with a new one more in tune with the existing state of Soviet-East European relations--is possible if several East European countries show signs of an impending withdrawal from the Pact.

Despite the conflicting Soviet signals, an unscheduled dismantling of the Soviet alliance system in Eastern Europe without a simultaneous dissolution of NATO would be a significant political defeat for the USSR that the Soviets would not accept lightly, even in the relaxed international conditions of the present. The USSR has bilateral treaties of "friendship and mutual assistance" with each East European country that would lessen the extent of damage to Soviet security (and, through preemption, the Soviets could limit the damage), but prestige, status, and perception--contributing aspects of state power--would suffer. In addition, once the Warsaw Pact falls apart, and given East Europeans' perception of a low threat from the West, the bilateral treaties would be next in line to be canceled or renegotiated. The current Finnish discussion about the renegotiation of the Soviet-Finnish treaty of "friendship and mutual assistance" is a sign of these treaties' fragility. In time, the Finnish debate will likely spread to Eastern Europe. Because of Poland's crucial importance within the Warsaw Pact (the Pact could conceivably survive a Hungarian withdrawal but not a Polish one), its continued membership is necessary for now to assure Soviet tolerance.

THE WESTERN ROLE

Polish leaders claim that without significant infusions of Western aid, the Polish transformation is bound to fail. These claims are not necessarily true. Aid may make the transition easier, but Western investment, technology, and political support is what is necessary. Two Western countries are especially important to Poland: the United States, as the leader of the Western world, and the Federal Republic of

Germany, as the dominant state in Western Europe and one with special interests in Poland. A lackluster U.S. commitment to Poland may weaken the Japanese and the West European responses, whereas a strong reaction will probably increase the other Western countries' contributions. In terms of what the Poles need, the FRG is the single most important country because of its strength as a source of investment and technology, its proximity and familiarity with the area, and its continued complex relationship with Poland, of which the Oder/Neisse border is just one aspect.

The West's stake in Poland is significant because of all the reasons that make Poland so important to the USSR. Neutralization of Poland would constitute another guarantee that the 40-year-old fear of Western defense planners--a massive Soviet attack on the FRG--is impossible. In addition, the West has a stake in Poland's successful redemocratization and a functioning market system for ideological reasons and as an example for other Communist countries.

THE DILEMMA

Given the geostrategic realities, the Polish government will have to pursue a careful foreign policy, one that will need to reassure the Soviets that their state interests in Eastern Europe are not threatened by the Polish transition. The Poles' diplomatic skills will be tested because Poland will be dealing with two seemingly different pulls. On the one hand, for the move to introduce a true market economy and private enterprise to be successful, closer ties with the West--especially with the FRG--will be necessary. On the other hand, Poland must remain a member of the alliance system that was set up as a mechanism of Soviet control over Eastern Europe and whose main bogeyman has been the FRG. Reconciling these seemingly contradictory motivations will be the task faced by the new Polish government. The relaxation of tensions and changes within the Warsaw Pact structure make the dilemma easier, but the basic problem remains.

III. THE CONSENSUS ON BASIC FOREIGN POLICY GOALS

THE ROUNDTABLE CONSENSUS

Foreign policy was not a topic of much discussion before Mazowiecki's nomination for the premiership. Indeed, in recognition of the importance of economic problems, the Polish opposition was almost entirely absorbed with domestic issues--or more precisely, ways of changing the socioeconomic model so it would be more efficient and responsive. During the roundtable talks in the spring of 1989, most spheres of domestic affairs were discussed in detail by Solidarity and the regime, but no discussions were held about international issues or foreign policy.

Reasons for the lack of discussion of foreign policy are important. Three possible ones come to mind: 1) a consensus on international issues existed; 2) the topic was controversial and both sides, in an attempt to reach an overall agreement, decided to shelve the issue temporarily; 3) the topic was not a priority. The first means that a contentious foreign policy debate in the future is unlikely; the second implies potential problems in the future because as the system continues to open up, presumed basic disagreements on state policy, given the continuing presence of significant number of communist deputies in the Sejm, will be difficult to exclude; the third is ambiguous regarding future foreign policy debates. In retrospect, foreign policy seems to have been genuinely noncontroversial and based on a general consensus because of a sense of political realism on both sides and favorable trends in the USSR. It is important to keep in mind, however, that a consensus between the two sides that participated in the roundtable talks does not mean a consensus on foreign policy among all Poles, for not all representatives of the Polish opposition participated in the talks. Only the moderate opposition that believes in evolutionary change was at the roundtable. The terms *moderate* and *radical* have specific meanings within the Polish opposition. Both groups want far-reaching shifts in the entire structure of political power in Poland. However, moderates

are willing to reform and reshape the system from within. Radicals want a sharp break with the regime; they wish to change the system by seeing it fall completely and replace it with new structures. Since the elections, the moderation in the segment of the opposition that came to power has been evident. Rather than completely abolishing old structures of power, the Mazowiecki government has acted to alter those structures from within. The rate of change has been breathtaking, but the change has been implemented through the institutions set up by the Communists. The radical opposition comprised a significant portion of the Polish opposition. The radicals' foreign policy views are more confrontational and uncompromising.

The Solidarity leaders who took part in the negotiations were aware of the Polish geostrategic predicament and realized they had to take into account Soviet fears about the border's security. As Solidarity leader Lech Walesa put it,

Poland must not forget where it stands, and what its obligations are, and it must realistically consider its possibilities and commitments. There is nothing we can do about it, and we have to consider and respect this.¹

However, within the constraints set by geopolitical realities, most Poles want to live in a country where basic freedoms are observed and at a standard of living closer to the level of Western Europe, rather than slipping ever further to the level of the Third World.² The main obstacle to achieving a higher standard of living is the inefficient

¹Interview with Lech Walesa, Mainz ZDF Television Service, in German, August 17, 1989 (translated in *FBIS-EEU*, No. 159, August 18, 1989, p. 36).

²Poland's drop in standard of living in relation to other European countries has been dramatic. For example, in 1960, Poland was at a 125/100 ratio in level of development compared to Spain, but by 1980, it had dropped to a ratio of 77/100. See Paul Marer, "The Economies and Trade of Eastern Europe," in William E. Griffith (ed.), *Central and Eastern Europe: The Opening Curtain*, Westview Press, Boulder, Colo., 1989, pp. 37-73. Poles have been able to travel relatively freely for quite some time and they can see the ever-growing difference in standard of living between Poland and the West.

system of management, production, and distribution. These problems stem from the Soviet socioeconomic model that was imposed on Poland in the late 1940s and whose main pillars have remained. Given the deideologization of Soviet-East European relations, Soviet reforms, and repeated Soviet pledges of noninterference in internal matters of the East European countries, the problem of altering the system seems domestic. Foreign policy questions derive from the main issue of structural economic changes in that once a rational economic system is set up, a change in Polish foreign policy toward the West becomes an integral component of the Polish transformation. Conversely, some distancing from the USSR can also be expected.

Solidarity's short-term goal is securing the preconditions for evolution to full democracy with a market economic system. A longer-term goal is Finlandization, neutrality, and rejoining the main body of Europe.³ At present, Solidarity sees the latter as achievable only through a lengthy, evolutionary manner as tensions lessen in Europe and the Soviets become accustomed to the idea that a fully sovereign Poland is not a threat but an asset. The party's reformist wing has no alternative to Solidarity's short-term goal and does not disagree with the longer-term objectives. Given conciliatory Soviet policies toward the West and Gorbachev's stated goal of seeing both alliances dissolved before the end of the century, the trends set by the Soviets are compatible with Solidarity's long-term goals.

In addition, a more autonomous Polish foreign policy since 1987 has also contributed to the emergence of a foreign policy consensus. The moves to place Polish-Soviet relations more on a level of equals by exposing lies and discussing previously taboo topics⁴ --steps initiated

³Solidarity officials have been careful to say that neutrality is their goal in the long run. See, for example, the interview with Zbigniew Bujak, *Mainichi Shimbun*, August 2, 1989 (translated in *FBIS-EEU*, No. 163, August 24, 1989, p. 5 Annex). Foreign Minister Krzysztof Skubiszewski has also stressed the far-off nature of Polish neutrality. See the interview with Skubiszewski in *La Vanguardia*, October 8, 1989 (translated in *FBIS-EEU*, No. 198, October 16, 1989, pp. 44-46).

⁴The campaign to clear up "blank spots" in Polish-Soviet relations is the most visible aspect of the effort to clear up lies. See Thomas

by the Polish and Soviet Communist parties--have had wide popular support (if tinged with skepticism about the pace and motivation for such moves) in Poland. The opening up of Poland to countries that were previously pariahs for ideological reasons, such as Chile, South Africa, Taiwan, South Korea, and Israel, also represents a move toward the pragmatic attitude toward the world Solidarity advocates. In this context, the Polish Communists initiated some of the moves Solidarity wants to deepen.

CONTINUITY AND CHANGE

The broad consensus on foreign policy that existed between the roundtable participants prevents any drastic departures in Polish foreign policy in the short term. General Wojciech Jaruzelski's presence in Polish politics as president of Poland strengthens the sense of continuity. Moreover, the Mazowiecki government is being watched with suspicion by the Soviets just because it is non-Communist; knowing this, it is likely to act cautiously. Despite all the tendencies in favor of continuity, a non-Communist government in Poland will pursue a deideologized foreign policy that will differ much in style and be substantively different from the Communists' foreign policy. Stemming from the internal changes and the attempt to redemocratize, the most important substantive shift in foreign policy is the intention to strike a greater balance between Polish-Soviet and Polish-German relations. The looming issue of German reunification only makes the shift more urgent.

S. Szayna, "Addressing 'Blank Spots' in Polish-Soviet Relations," *Problems of Communism*, Vol. 37, No. 6, November-December 1988, pp. 37-61; and Vera Tolz and Thomas Sherlock, "Latest Attempts to Review History of Soviet-Polish Relations," *Report on the USSR*, Vol. 1, No. 25, June 23, 1989, pp. 1-4. Renewed attention to the treatment of ethnic Poles in the USSR and other East European countries, a *cause celebre* of the Polish opposition for several decades, is an example of a taboo broken. See "New Treatment of Poles in the Soviet Union," *RFE, Situation Report, Poland*, No. 11, September 1, 1987, pp. 21-23.

IV. FOREIGN POLICY BLUEPRINTS

BROAD POLICY OUTLINES

The basic outlines of Polish foreign policy the Mazowiecki government intends to pursue were formulated in Solidarity's statement on foreign policy (published in May 1989)¹ and in the foreign minister's speech at the United Nations in September 1989.² Three main themes are evident in these statements: 1) the establishment of equal relations between the USSR and Poland; 2) greater interaction and cooperation with the West; 3) increased attention to global issues, such as human rights, in foreign policy. The first theme is stated emphatically as a nonnegotiable right. The Solidarity statement affirms Poland's full sovereignty even as it acknowledges the geostrategic realities by reaffirming the continued Polish membership in the much-changed Warsaw Pact:

[G]uaranteeing full state sovereignty requires that Poland place relations with its allies on equal footing. Not questioning and not undermining the Warsaw Pact, we believe nevertheless that its functioning has been based on a principle of subordinating the smaller partners to the stronger, which caused the former harmful political, economic, and social consequences. . . . [A]n alliance based on subordination should be replaced by an alliance of cooperation, without an ideological stamp.

In comparison with Poland's previous state of relations with the USSR, this is a revolutionary statement. Regarding the second theme, the United States and the FRG are singled out as especially important. Overcoming the animosity in Polish-German relations in a manner that has taken place in French-German relations is specifically mentioned as a

¹"Polska i Swiat: Oswiadczenie w Sprawach Miedzynarodowych" (Poland and the world: declaration on international affairs), *Tygodnik Powszechny*, May 14, 1989.

²For full text, see *Rzeczpospolita*, September 26, 1989 (translated in *FBIS-EEU*, No. 188, September 29, 1989, pp. 37-40).

priority. The foreign minister attached special significance to this issue. As to the third theme, Solidarity promises to make ecological concerns and human rights issues important tenets of Polish foreign policy. Nothing in either of the Polish statements conflicts with Soviet state interests, and the Polish goals are in general agreement with Gorbachev's statements about the future of Europe and the transformation of the Warsaw Pact.

The two Polish statements are general outlines that proclaim overall policy aims but say nothing about the particulars of Polish foreign policy. Yet these particulars of Polish policy toward the Germans and toward the USSR are interesting and complicated. Polish foreign policy toward the FRG and the USSR is entwined in the Poles' views on the Polish dilemma. In the approach to this geographical dilemma, Polish Communists have relied on the USSR to keep Polish borders secure and to keep themselves in power in Poland. The pro-Soviet line was dictated by the Soviets but was also a response to post-World War II territorial shifts and a lesson from 1939, when Poland's dependence on faraway powers to guarantee its sovereignty proved impossible to sustain. Although alignment with either Hitler's Germany or Stalin's USSR was impossible in 1939 because both dictators wanted to destroy the Polish state, the German-Soviet collusion to eliminate Poland as a state and the consequent catastrophe for the Polish nation remain the fundamental determinants of Polish foreign policy thinking.

THE GERMAN POLICY

The shifting of Polish borders westward in 1945 effectively eliminated for a time the possibility of a Polish rapprochement with the FRG. As long as the FRG did not recognize the Oder/Neisse border and the German question remained unresolved, the Poles were dependent on the USSR to guarantee their frontier. The Polish dilemma began to change with the FRG's *Ostpolitik*. In the Treaty of Warsaw, signed in December 1970, the FRG *de facto* recognized the Oder/Neisse border, thus removing the main obstacle to better relations. Detente and the Helsinki agreement further eroded the need for dependency on the USSR. After the

1970s, as part of a search for alternatives to dependency on the USSR, an ever-growing conviction took hold among the Polish opposition intellectuals that only the establishment of normal relations with both the Germans and the Soviets could remove the Poles' insecurity about their own borders. In other words, a growing recognition existed that aligning with one neighbor against the other still exposed Poland to domination and dependency--that is, the basic problem of survival was solved, but it was replaced by satellite status that constrained Poland's international ties. The establishment of organized opposition (outside the Church) in the mid-1970s provided venues for such views. In 1977, the Polish Independence Compact (PPN [Polskie Porozumienie Niepodleglosciowe]) published a document entitled "Poland and Germany" in which the regime's falsifications regarding the Germans were criticized. The formation of an underground circuit of lectures (the "Flying University"), where distinguished scholars active in the opposition lectured on topics the censor prohibited--including honest examinations of Polish-German relations--was a step toward de-vilifying the Germans to a wider Polish audience. These trends emerged publicly during the initial Solidarity era in 1980-1981 and continued in underground publications and in the Catholic press following martial law.

By the mid-1980s, moderate opposition intellectuals developed a sophisticated alternative approach to dealing with the Polish dilemma. It neither relied on one neighbor against the other nor ignored the presence of the two powerful neighbors, but was instead based on a satisfactory solution for all parties concerned. The motivating concept of this approach is the indivisibility of the transition toward democracy in the region. In this view, the enemy was recognized to be the entrenched centralized system of power laying claim to supervision of all spheres of life. This system, in various stages of decay, was common to all the Communist countries of Eastern Europe. Because the system itself established extensive links between the countries and actually claimed to have evolved into a supracountry, supranational entity that jealously guarded its domain--and, as the instances of

Czechoslovakia in 1968 and Poland in 1981 showed, was willing to use or threaten to use military force to keep the system in place--the moderate opposition clustering around Walesa linked Polish reforms to regionwide reforms. In more practical terms, the opposition intellectuals took the lessons of 1968 and 1981 to mean that for one East European state to evolve into a liberal democracy while surrounded by states professing allegiance to Communist orthodoxy was impossible. The other regimes would feel threatened by such an island of reform and would conspire to destroy it.³

The German Democratic Republic (GDR) presented a special problem in this outlook. On the one hand, the GDR's existence guaranteed Polish western borders; on the other, regionwide reforms and the principle of self-determination could not be advocated to the exclusion of the GDR, yet reforms in the GDR could easily result in a gradual drift toward the reunification of the two German states--an event that could lead to a questioning of the Polish borders. Several factors pushed the moderate Polish opposition to advocate reforms in the GDR openly. First and most important was the deepening realization that an artificial state west of Poland that was dependent on the USSR for its survival did not safeguard the Polish borders, but rather acted as a barrier to more meaningful Polish relations with the West. Second, the dispute between Poland and the GDR over the demarcation of territorial waters in the Bay of Pomerania quickly escalated to a nasty border dispute, settled only by an emergency meeting of GDR general secretary Erich Honecker and Jaruzelski in the spring of 1989. The dispute was interpreted by many Poles as having demonstrated the vacuous nature of the argument that the GDR's existence made the border safe; it also showed that the supposedly friendly Polish-GDR relations were in fact full of contradictions.

³An early indication of the regionwide thinking came in the fall of 1981, when Solidarity called for the formation of independent trade unions throughout the Soviet bloc. During the 1980s, the indivisibility of reform was a common theme in the writings of many opposition figures (for example, Adam Michnik). Viewing the Polish internal problem in regionwide terms is also illustrated by the growth of underground publications dealing exclusively with affairs in other Communist countries: *ABC*, *Oboz*, *Nowa Koalicja*, *Miedzymorze*, *Zona*.

Third, on a more emotional level, the GDR regime's moves to rehabilitate certain historical German figures were received with hostility in Poland. These moves were part of the regime's striving for greater legitimacy by aligning itself more with German history. But although rehabilitating Frederick the Great or Bismarck may have had a positive connotation for many Germans, these figures are known in Poland mainly for their excesses against the Poles. The GDR's closer identification with the authoritarian (and, to the Poles, anti-Polish) history of Germany stood in contrast to the prosperous democracy in the FRG--a model most Poles would gladly emulate--and the FRG's generous aid to Poland in the 1970s and early 1980s.

In short, the GDR began to look more like a liability than an asset, especially as the period of relaxation in international tensions in Europe began to look more long-lasting than the initial detente and old ideological divisions began to crumble. In such a changing situation, Poland could not afford to remain a "Yalta state," dependent on divisions within Europe. The economic integration of Western Europe in 1992 means that German nationalism is highly unlikely to become a threatening force to Poland, because a unified Europe simply will not allow it. Within the framework of an integrated Europe, Solidarity is prepared to acquiesce to the reunification of Germany. Such a move would be in Polish interests, for the barrier between Poland and the West would then be removed and Poland could begin to integrate itself into the larger European community, as well as to serve as an important middleman between the West and the USSR. In this way, Polish sovereignty from the USSR and Poland's rejoining of the European community of states would be accomplished.

The basic concept beneath the new approach to the German question stems from the Poles' unequivocal embracing of the principle of self-determination--a motivation resulting from the search for a solution to the Polish internal systemic transformation. One formulator of the opposition intellectuals' German policy (and a founding member of a group of intellectuals who meet regularly to discuss the German issue) summarized the point well:

There are clearly no differences among Poles on the border issue. But the Polish opposition is open regarding a reunification of Germany. It sees many disadvantages in the division of the country which encircled Poland, separated it from the West and made it border on the German Democratic Republic with which it now shares a border of mutual mistrust. The Polish opposition thus in principle holds that the reunification issue should be a matter for the Germans, just as the political system in their own country should be a matter for the Poles.⁴

These views have been publicly and seemingly genuinely supported by some top Solidarity figures.⁵

The current Polish policy toward the German question, as outlined by Foreign Minister Krzysztof Skubiszewski on several occasions, is clearly based on the opposition's views. The Germans' right to reunification is acknowledged, but the actual reunification is seen as a distant possibility. In agreement with the view that internal matters must be settled by the people in question, Skubiszewski stressed that Germans themselves must solve the problem, with the proviso that a reunification must occur with the consent of the four powers that occupied Germany and that all European countries, especially Germany's neighbors, must approve such a move.⁶ The last point is a Polish claim to have a say in any agreement on the reunification of Germany (though it is questionable how realistic the claim is). Notably, since German reunification suddenly became a realistic possibility with the toppling of the regime in the GDR, official Polish statements have begun to stress that a rapid reunification would be destabilizing and that a gradual process is preferable (a position not much different from the British or French positions).

⁴Artur Hajnicz, "Poland within Its Geopolitical Triangle," *Aussenpolitik*, Vol. 40, No. 1, 1989, pp. 30-40.

⁵Interview with Bronislaw Geremek in *Bild am Sonntag*, September 3, 1989 (translated in *FBIS-EEU*, No. 171, September 6, 1989 pp. 36-37).

⁶Interview with Skubiszewski, PAP in English (Warsaw), October 1, 1989 (published in *FBIS-EEU*, No. 189, October 2, 1989, pp. 48-49).

The Polish Communists can no longer be said to oppose the reunification of Germany or Solidarity's blueprint for German policy. The reformist wing of the party now in control agreed *de facto* to the transformation of the Polish economy by signing the roundtable agreement. The foreign policy consequences of the Polish turn toward the West could not have been lost on them, and a top party member (and ex-foreign minister), Marian Orzechowski, explicitly embraced the necessity of changing Poland's relationship with the FRG in his speech to the parliament during the inauguration of the Mazowiecki government.⁷ In any case, Polish Communists had begun to implement some steps in preparation for the pro-German shift soon after Gorbachev came to power. These efforts did not come to much because of internal contradictions and larger issues, but the party was clearly searching for a *modus vivendi* with the FRG. At present, party intellectuals dealing with German issues openly admit the inevitability of German reunification and worry only that it be carried out in a manner not damaging to Polish interests--that is, through an evolutionary process that would not undermine stability in Europe.⁸ The shift in Polish policy toward the Germans is dictated by larger international forces--Soviet-FRG relations, the FRG's role in Western Europe--and Poland cannot buck these trends. Differences between reformist party and Solidarity intellectuals may arise over the magnitude of the shift toward the FRG, but not about the direction itself.

THE SOVIET POLICY

Until the advent of Gorbachev, the Polish opposition viewed the USSR as the fundamental cause of the illegitimate government in Poland. The opposition's hopes were that the Soviet leaders would become fed up with the recurring instability in Poland and its damaging echo on the economic performance of other Council for Mutual Economic Assistance

⁷For the full text of Orzechowski's speech, see Warsaw Television Service, in Polish, 1035 GMT, September 12, 1989 (translated in *FBIS-EEU*, No. 178, September 15, 1989, pp. 50-53).

⁸See the interview with Professor Antoni Czubinski, director of Poland's Institute of Germanic Studies, *Wybrzeze*, August 20, 1989.

(CMEA) countries, and that the Soviets themselves would realize that it would be in their self-interest to look upon the moderate Polish opposition as a viable partner. The change in Soviet attitudes toward Poland was tied specifically to Soviet internal changes. The hope, as expressed prophetically by prominent oppositionist Adam Michnik in June 1983, was that a politically innovative team would come to power in Moscow:

It cannot be excluded that people with political imagination, even the one represented by Khrushchev, will come to the top of the Soviet leadership. . . . In such an arrangement, a chance for democracy, political reform and a national compact would open for Poland.⁹

Then, keeping with the idea that reforms had to be regionwide, the opposition saw Poland's role as one of advancing the evolution in the USSR by example so as to further the cause of democratization in the USSR and Eastern Europe, though always being careful not to arouse Soviet security concerns.

The long period of Soviet interference in Polish affairs produced an initial skepticism of Gorbachev. However, according to Michnik, beginning in 1987 the moderate opposition began to pay close attention to the changes in the USSR.¹⁰ Since that time, with the principle of the indivisibility of reforms in mind, the Polish opposition took advantage of the Soviet reforms and quickly established contacts with the national fronts in the Baltic republics, Belorussia, Ukraine, Moldavia, and with the reformist Interregional Group of Deputies in the Supreme Soviet.

Although Solidarity acknowledges a change in Soviet attitudes toward it from hostility to interest and goodwill, the fear that the Soviet reforms may be stopped and partially reversed--with terrible consequences for Poland--is still present. This assumed potential for negative spillover is another reason for Polish activism on behalf of *perestroika* in the USSR:

⁹Preface to an interview with Michnik (quoting his earlier comments), *Tygodnik Powszechny*, June 4, 1989.

¹⁰*Ibid.*

[A] regression [in the USSR], . . . is bound to spread to Poland so that even the prospects now unlocking may be locked up again. Thus, we as Poles are interested in the evolutionary advancement of the USSR in the direction of democracy.¹¹

The Sejm speaker, Mikolaj Kozakiewicz, went even further:

[T]he fall of Gorbachev, the defeat of *perestroika*, and the advent of a military dictatorship in the Soviet Union could lead to the restoration of the old system in Poland.¹²

Polish fears about the consequences for Poland were the reforms in the USSR to stop may be exaggerated. The return to a failed system in the USSR seems unlikely. Moreover, the USSR has been weakened by the nationalities problems so that a retrenchment within the current Soviet borders may be all it will be capable of. In short, the current Soviet internal problems have weakened its leverage over Poland and the persistence of the problems means that the weakening is becoming permanent. Remembering that it is a weakening and not a disappearance of leverage is important, however. For example, during the intense discussions about the formation of a non-Communist government in Poland in the summer of 1989, the Soviets' power (or at least Solidarity's perception of Soviet power) was still strong enough to contribute to the inclusion of the Communists in the Mazowiecki coalition government. In the words of Geremek,

During the dialogue which preceded the decision to form a coalition, people said: "We will form a government without the Communists." This remark immediately had serious consequences and warning lights came on everywhere: the Army, the police, the party apparatus, and *Moscow* [my emphasis]. In my view, we must never create a "Kabul-type situation" in

¹¹Andrzej Friszke, "Nasza Wschodnia Polityka" (Our Eastern policy), *Tygodnik Solidarnosc*, No. 1, June 2, 1989 (translated in *Joint Publications Research Service, East Europe Report* [JPRS-EER] No. 79, July 13, 1989, pp. 5-7).

¹²Interview with Kozakiewicz, *Corriere della Sera*, September 4, 1989 (translated in *FBIS-EEU*, No. 191, October 4, 1989, pp. 6-7 Annex).

which the former regime's representatives feel that they have no chance of surviving.¹³

The Soviets kept an extremely close watch on the developments in Poland during the summer of 1989, and the Soviet ambassador in Poland played an important role in signaling what was acceptable to the Soviets.¹⁴

Concern for Soviet security considerations was what led Solidarity grudgingly to accept Jaruzelski as president of Poland. As Walesa put it, "[W]e agreed that the president should be a Communist because our membership in the Warsaw Pact, among other things, was at stake."¹⁵

Within the context of little Soviet leverage over Poland, and considering the changed alliance structure, Solidarity does not see Polish membership in the Warsaw Pact as a problem. The remoteness of military conflict in Europe and the breakup of old ideological divisions make membership in the Warsaw Pact a formality. Polish government representatives have openly said that the Polish army will not be used in any offensive operations against the West; in terms of the pre-Gorbachev military plans, this is a declaration of neutrality.¹⁶ The Polish parliament's quick condemnation of Polish participation in the invasion of Czechoslovakia, the placing of the military under parliamentary control, and the changes within the structure of the Warsaw Pact mean that the Polish military will not be used in any possible future Soviet military interventions in Eastern Europe. As Aleksander Bentkowski, president of the Peasant party parliamentary group, put it, "I would not identify the Warsaw Pact with the Communist order. We want to establish a normal order, a parliamentary democracy. Remaining in the Pact does not bother us."¹⁷ Because the Warsaw Pact has

¹³Interview with Geremek, *Liberation*, August 22, 1989 (translated in *FBIS-EEU*, No. 167, August 30, 1989, p. 44).

¹⁴Interview with Jaroslaw Kaczynski, Walesa's deputy for setting up the Solidarity-led government in the summer of 1989. *PWA* (underground), No. 206, September 22, 1989.

¹⁵Interview with Walesa, *L'Unita*, August 22, 1989 (translated in *FBIS-EEU*, No. 164, August 25, 1989, p. 43).

¹⁶Interview with Polish foreign minister Krzysztof Skubiszewski, *Ha'aretz*, October 19, 1989 (translated in *FBIS-EEU*, No. 206, October 26, 1989, pp. 56-57).

¹⁷Interview with Bentkowski, *Le Figaro*, August 22, 1989 (translated in *FBIS-EEU*, No. 166, August 29, 1989, p. 36).

become an irrelevant shell for the purposes of Soviet control over the East European countries, the Poles are willing to put up with Warsaw Pact membership as they continue on their way to Finlandization, if not Austrianization. Because of Poland's critical importance to the Soviet position in Eastern Europe and the Mazowiecki government's cautious attitude toward the USSR, Poland will not likely initiate the East European stampede out of the Warsaw Pact. Hungary is much more likely to begin such a move.

For internal and external reasons, the reformist Polish Communists have no major differences with Solidarity's planned Soviet policy. The Polish Communist party is very different from what it was ten or even five years ago. The party's debacle during martial law was so great that the party never recovered, and the elections in June 1989 demonstrated conclusively the extent of popular resentment against the party. The intraparty debate going on since the spring of 1989 makes it increasingly likely that at the next party congress (early 1990), the party will be transformed into a smaller organization more like a social-democratic party, in a manner similar to the Hungarian Communist party's transformation (though probably with even more disastrous consequences for the Communists in Poland). The reformist Communists realize the West's crucial role in aiding Poland's economy and also support the Soviet reforms. In addition, the Polish reformist Communists share the rest of Poles' fears about the possible harmful consequences to Poland resulting from a German-Soviet rapprochement that excludes Poland. The specter of Rapallo and the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact (German-Soviet collusion at the expense of Poland) is strong in the minds of Poles, and alarm bells went off in Warsaw during Gorbachev's extraordinarily friendly visit to Bonn in June 1989. Therefore, in a time when Genscher is the most enthusiastic Western supporter of Gorbachev, Solidarity's plan for a rearrangement of Polish foreign policy in a nonthreatening manner to either the USSR or the Germans carries much support among the party reformers.¹⁸ Differences between party and Solidarity figures

¹⁸Adam Rottfeld, "Ciaglosc i zmiana w polskiej polityce zagranicznej" (Continuity and change in Polish foreign policy), *Nowe Drogi*, No. 6, June 1989, pp. 152-165.

undoubtedly exist on the issue of foreign relations, but they involve changes in pace and extent of orientations rather than fundamental disagreements.¹⁹

¹⁹The editor of Poland's foreign policy journal recently elaborated on the reformist party line regarding Polish-Soviet relations; see Michal Dobroczynski, "Zmiany na Wschodzie a szanse Polski" (Changes in the East and Poland's chances), *Sprawy Miedzynarodowe*, June 1989.

V. THE ROLE OF POLISH NATIONALISM

The Polish transition has the potential of being derailed by a worsening economic situation. Initial reports on the effects of the economic reforms have been encouraging, especially in lowering inflation. In 1990, however, the situation could become volatile as the economic reforms' full impact makes itself felt. The resulting unemployment and displacements will produce winners and losers and will accentuate the gaps between the rich and the poor (in a country with strong egalitarian tendencies). The real possibility of bankruptcy for some firms means that huge, inefficient, and underutilized factories--shipyards and steel mills--that employ some of the most militant workers (a social group exalted for many decades) may cease to operate. The sheer magnitude of the economic shifts suggests that strikes, possibly accompanied by violence and vandalism, will become a common occurrence in Poland. Western aid may lessen some of the reforms' negative impact, but it will not eliminate it. Economic dislocations and resulting popular unrest will have some impact on Polish foreign policy. More important, the Polish government can easily become vulnerable to domestic criticism because of its foreign policy. Reasons for such vulnerability are embedded in the peculiar nature of Polish nationalism.

POLISH NATIONALISM DEFINED

Polish nationalism, a dominant force throughout 20th-century Poland but especially in the fairly homogenous post-World War II Polish state, has had a major influence on the Poles' perceptions of their eastern and western neighbors and in shaping contemporary Polish political culture. Although the influence of Polish nationalism is strongest at the popular level, the elite's views are also colored by it to a certain extent. Polish mass-level perceptions will play a role in shaping Polish foreign policy, for too great a divergence between elite and popular perceptions will reduce support for the government and thus contribute to the demise of the Polish attempt at redemocratization. Polish political culture,

based on a nationalistic *weltanschauung*, will also play an important role in determining the success of the Polish attempt at transformation.¹

Although *nationalism* strictly defined simply refers to a learned group feeling demanding devotion and allegiance to the nation state as the fundamental loyalty of each individual of a given nation,² in practice nationalism has been shown to be a revolutionary doctrine that has motivated various peoples and nationalities to organize into nation states. Polish nationalism, typical of East European nationalism, differs significantly from West European nationalism and even its German variation. Whereas nationalism in Western Europe accompanied social, economic, and political changes caused by the Enlightenment, in Eastern Europe, nationalism preceded such changes.³ Just as applying new Western ideas to the different, less advanced conditions in German-speaking lands led to the chauvinistic and aggressive German nationalism, applying Western ideas in the even more backward conditions and institutions in Eastern Europe led to the emergence of nationalism based on irrational and pre-Enlightenment concepts, founded on myths of the past and tending toward exclusiveness. Because a biased interpretation of history caused nationalists of Eastern Europe to believe that a special creative genius of their nations had been stifled by foreigners or by foreign ideas, East European nationalism became a force aimed at creating conditions suitable for this genius to reappear. The task was to be accomplished by eliminating all foreign influence and convincing the members of a given nationality of their genius by making them aware of their supposed greatness. As a consequence, "xenophobia,

¹For a recent examination of the barriers Polish political culture poses to redemocratization, see Ewa Morawska, "On Barriers to Pluralism in Pluralist Poland," *Slavic Review*, Vol. 47, No. 4, Winter 1988, pp. 627-641, especially pp. 636-641.

²Peter F. Sugar, "External and Domestic Roots of Eastern European Nationalism," in Peter F. Sugar and Ivo J. Lederer (eds.), *Nationalism in Eastern Europe*, University of Washington Press, Seattle, Wash., 1969, p. 8.

³Hans Kohn, *The Idea of Nationalism: A Study in Its Origins and Background*, 2nd ed., Macmillan, New York, 1961, p. 457.

historicism, and a forced feeling of superiority emerged as decisive forces in Europe,"⁴ including Poland.

Although only the Germans, and possibly the Russians, have aroused popular feelings of hatred among Poles, wariness of virtually all other nationalities and suspicion of their intentions has been an integral part of modern Polish history. Historicism has been one of the most noticeable aspects of 20th-century Poland, and the constant comparison and identification of the past with the present only reinforces xenophobic traits. The use of selective and inaccurate interpretations of history made Polish nationalists exalt all things they considered Polish, but it also meant downplaying everything connected with other peoples. The nationalities inhabiting the lands east of Poland bore the brunt of the belittling tendency and came to be perceived as backward and inferior. The consequence has been an attitude of condescension and arrogance among Poles toward many of their neighboring nationalities, especially the Eastern Slavs (Russians, Byelorussians, and Ukrainians).⁵

Besides the xenophobia, historicism, and arrogance common to all nationalities of Eastern Europe, Polish nationalism developed several additional unique traits: it became messianic, it developed a close identity with Roman Catholicism, and it was significantly influenced by the Polish National Democracy movement. In the context of Polish nationalism, messianism meant that the natural tendency toward exclusiveness was taken to the extreme and the exclusiveness was extended to all members of a given nationality.⁶ In such a form, messianism assigned the role of "Christ among nations" to Poland. Messianism is a notion that ignores the rights of an individual in favor of the group; it posits the fatherland as an entity through which an individual citizen's role is given meaning. The close identity between Polish nationality and Roman Catholicism is grounded in the centuries-long relationship between that nation and the Church. That the two

⁴Sugar and Lederer, *Nationalism*, p. 35.

⁵Peter Brock, "Polish Nationalism," in Sugar and Lederer, *Nationalism*.

⁶Sugar and Lederer, *Nationalism*, p. 11.

major powers that destroyed the Polish state in the 18th century, Russia and Prussia, were mainly Orthodox and Protestant, respectively, only strengthened the bond; in effect, it became nearly necessary for all those who wished to be considered Polish to be Roman Catholic. In this sense, the Church assumed the role of a means through which Poles could demonstrate their nationalist feelings. The political philosophy of the National Democracy (a movement that emerged as the single most important political force in Poland during the second half of the 19th century) gave Polish nationalism a peculiar authoritarian flavor and elevated the issue of Polish statehood to unparalleled importance because of its ideas that nationality is of extreme significance in defining a human being and that a nation-state must exist to assure the nationality's survival. National Democracy had strong currents of anti-Semitism and anti-German feelings; these orientations strengthened the xenophobic aspects of Polish nationalism. The components of Polish nationalism are mutually reinforcing; together, they have produced a powerful ideology that has been responsible for making Polish society the most independent in the Soviet-dominated Eastern Europe and for causing Poland to be the most uncertain Soviet ally in the Warsaw Pact. In contemporary Poland, as limits on public expression have been largely removed, a surge of Polish nationalism has occurred.⁷ It is a force that cannot be ignored.

THE MANIPULATION OF NATIONALISM

During their stay in power, the Communists consciously strengthened some characteristics of Polish nationalism. Most important, the feelings of animosity toward the Germans were fostered by the regime so as to focus Polish historicism and xenophobia on the Germans rather than the Russians. The history of World War II was presented in a skewed manner, especially as it related to Poland. Most Poles are only vaguely aware (if at all) that Jews were the main target of German extermination policies in Poland. To Poles, World War II has come to be revered as an

⁷See, for example, "Wobec Odrodzenia Nacjonalizmu" (Regarding the rebirth of nationalism), *Biuletyn Lodzki* (underground), No. 129, March 8, 1989.

example of martyrdom and suffering, which, in a messianic sense, are seen in a positive light. Poles are almost morbidly proud that more than six million Polish citizens were killed during the war, but few of them know that some three million Polish citizens were killed because they were Jewish and that ethnic Poles were often ambivalent toward the plight of the Jews. Since German policies in occupied Poland were probably the cruelest of their policies in any of the occupied countries (only parts of Yugoslavia and some Slavic areas of the USSR are comparable), the popular image of German barbarism had a good deal of truth to it; thus, the historical education sanctioned by the regime was an exaggeration believable at the mass level where no alternative sources of information existed.

The emphasis on the Piast myth in order to justify the Polish claims to the ex-German territories east of the Oder and Neisse rivers had a specific anti-German tinge to it. The Piast myth was a peculiar invention of Polish nationalists belonging to the National Democracy movement in the 19th century; it focused on the kingdom of the Piast dynasty in 9th-10th centuries.⁸ The Piasts, who ruled the territories roughly approximating the present Polish borders, were Slavs, some of whom later came to be called Poles. In the idea propagated by the communists, Germans were portrayed as the ancient enemy who seized the old Polish lands ruled by the Piasts. Since that time, they had proceeded with their *Drang nach Osten*, of which Hitler was only the latest instigator; Hitler had been preceded by Bismarck, Frederick the Great, the Teutonic knights, Barbarossa, and others.

The Polish regime employed the Piast myth massively after World War II to speed up the autochthonization in the ex-German territories and make the postwar territorial shifts irreversible. Simultaneously, the image of Germans as the enemy and the fear of renewed German expansionism were reinforced by the constant publicity the regime gave to virtually *any* comment made in the FRG that could possibly be

⁸For a lengthier elaboration of the Piast myth, see Norman Davies, "Poland's Multicultural Heritage," *Acta Slavica Iaponica*, Vol. 4, 1986, pp. 79-87.

construed as irredentist with respect to the territories east of the Oder and Neisse rivers. These comments were presented as examples of the prevalent "revanchist" attitudes in the FRG against Poland.

The Polish Communists followed the Soviet lead in distinguishing between the two German states; the FRG was presented as the continuation of all the negative traits in German history, while the GDR was portrayed as a sharp break with the German past and the initiation of a new, progressive chapter in German history. How successful in influencing popular perceptions the distinction has been is questionable. Polish nationalism assigns enormous weight to one's nationality, and, to most Poles, a German is still a German, whether from the FRG or the GDR. A long-standing large program on youth exchange between the GDR and Poland was supposed to have ameliorated the popular perceptions but did not have the desired effect. Greater exposure to each other may easily produce contempt--especially since the Polish prejudice toward the Germans is reciprocated by similar feelings toward the Poles on the part of some Germans--and that seems to have happened in Polish-GDR mass perceptions.⁹ Nationalistically motivated condescension by some Germans toward all Slavs and the traditional German contempt for the Poles' supposed lack of organizational skills (as illustrated by the derogatory connotation of the term *Polnische Wirtschaft*) is not far below the surface.¹⁰ Solidarity's statement on foreign policy and West German chancellor Helmut Kohl's comments on several occasions that there is a real need to break the negative images Poles and Germans have of one another only show that these problems of mass perception exist, that they exert powerful influence, and that leaders of the two countries are concerned about them. The recent

⁹Dawid Warszawski, "By Stosunki Miedzynarodowe staly sie miedzynarodowymi" (So that international relations become relations between nations), *Powsciagliwosc i Praca*, June-July 1989.

¹⁰Much of the anti-Polish prejudice is at the subconscious level. For example, even respected contemporary literary figures in the FRG are wont to wonder whether Poles are capable of understanding the meaning of freedom. See Robert von Dassanowsky-Harris, "Pommern/Pomorze: Christine Brueckner's Search for the 'Lost Germany,'" *East European Quarterly*, Vol. 23, No. 3, September 1989, pp. 327-337.

Polish-GDR agreement to further expand youth exchanges to break negative stereotypes is a sign of the same phenomenon in Polish-GDR relations.

The Communists attempted to weaken the Polish feelings of superiority toward the Eastern Slavs by glorifying the Slavic connection and stressing the common struggle against the Germans. These efforts proved largely unsuccessful because the repressive Communist system in Poland that stood against some basic aspects of "Polishness" (such as the close identity with the Roman Catholic church) was seen to have been set up by the USSR,¹¹ and the USSR is often synonymous with the Russians at the popular level. The Poles' and Eastern Slavs' (and Lithuanians') mutual animosity toward each other and the fact that their animosity had been an obstacle in establishing normal relations was acknowledged by Jaruzelski and Gorbachev in April 1987, when the two leaders signed a declaration that was to initiate moves to clear up these feelings.¹²

Polish nationalism's continued vitality and its impact on issues of international significance was evident during the controversy in the summer of 1989 about the presence of a Carmelite convent near the Auschwitz extermination camp. Because of the Communists' skewing of historical education in Poland, many Poles remain convinced that it was the Poles (regardless of their religious affiliation) who were the chief target of Hitler's extermination policies. In this sense, they view Auschwitz as a symbol of mainly Polish (not Jewish) suffering. Such a view of history led to many Poles' misinterpretation of the Jewish protests against the convent and it tapped the historic wells of Polish anti-Semitism. Certain traits within Polish nationalism--such as xenophobia, messianism, attachment to Roman Catholicism, and the influence of National Democracy--inflamed the issue. The controversy embarrassed the Mazowiecki government and placed the prime minister in a difficult situation that included an intemperate outburst by the Israeli prime minister and widespread international condemnation.

¹¹The system's fundamental lack of legitimacy has been at the root of Poland's repeated crises since World War II. For a recent examination of Polish history in this light, see William P. Avery, "Political Legitimacy and Crisis in Poland," *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 103, No. 1, 1988, pp. 111-130.

¹²Szayna, "Addressing 'Blank Spots,'" pp. 39-40.

The Carmelite convent controversy shows that popular feelings can influence Polish foreign policy and that nationalistically inspired tendencies may contribute to unforeseen and undesired incidents that spark international reaction. Although the biases and prejudices are mainly at the mass level, they exert a great force on policymakers by limiting the elite's freedom of action. In contemporary Poland, a state where parliamentary debates on policy issues are conducted freely, the press is virtually unhindered, and fully open elections are becoming the norm, the influence of popular feelings cannot be ignored.

VI. OBSTACLES TO POLISH FOREIGN POLICY

INTERNAL SOURCES OF OPPOSITION

Several internal sources pose a potential threat to the Mazowiecki government's stability and the evolutionary road to redemocratization. The most important sources are radical opposition groups, including militant workers organized in anti-Walesa Solidarity factions, and populists and some elements within the Communist party.

The Radicals

The current Solidarity is very different from what it was in 1980-1981. Whereas in the initial period, Solidarity was synonymous with opposition because it was a social movement in the sociological sense of the word,¹ it has assumed the nature of a coalition of moderate reformist forces since its relegalization in 1989. Since the mid-1980s following a brief radicalization of the Polish opposition after martial law, most of the opposition has reverted to its evolutionary programs and limited goals.² However, a significant portion of the opposition is openly distrustful of the coalition of oppositionists clustered around Walesa. The groupings with more radical views can be divided into three main categories: nationalists, militant workers, and conservatives associated with the Church.

The nationalists, consisting of groups such as the KPN (Confederation for an Independent Poland), are within the mainstream of Polish nationalism.³ These groups tend to be openly anti-Soviet (and

¹David S. Mason, "Solidarity as a New Social Movement," *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 104, No. 1, 1989, pp. 41-58.

²For example, see the following articles in the underground press: "Nasza Racja Stanu" (Our raison d'etat), *PWA*, No. 15, April 28, 1989, Ewa Lec, "Nowy Realizm" (The 'new realism'), *Krytyka*, No. 18, 1985 (translated in *East European Reporter*, Vol. 1, No. 2, 1985, pp. 19-22, especially p. 21).

³Another radical nationalist group, the Polish Independence party, shows clear messianic strains, condescension toward the peoples east of Poland, and historicism. See "Spor o Prawice" (The dispute about the right wing), *Most-Wolne Pismo* (underground), No. 18, 1988.

often anti-German) in their orientation. They want a far-ranging transformation of Polish society without paying attention to Soviet interests in the area.

The militant workers organized in anti-Walesa factions of Solidarity are led by some of the most prominent leaders of Solidarity from 1980-1981. Walesa's personal leadership style (high-handedness, lack of concern for others' opinions) and differences over substantive issues led to a break between Walesa and his erstwhile lieutenants. Initial reaction of Walesa's ex-colleagues to his assuming an expressly political role and his negotiations with the regime at the roundtable was to label him a traitor to the nation and the Solidarity trade union.⁴ So far, these views have not altered greatly. The militant worker leaders share a personal antipathy toward Walesa and their vision of Poland is influenced by an egalitarian strain of Polish nationalism.

Conservatives associated with the Church have distrusted the opposition's Walesa wing because of its predominantly moderate social-democratic outlook and its failure to espouse items on the conservatives' social agenda, such as abortion. The intellectuals who belonged to the KOR (Committee for the Defense of the Workers) opposition group in the 1970s and who have formed the core of Walesa's advisers have been especially attacked by the conservatives because of the ex-KOR members' membership in the party in the 1960s and because of their lack of enthusiasm for the Church. Conservatives associated with the Church accuse the ex-KOR people of trying to create a coalition that excludes the conservatives. The conservatives' animosity toward the ex-KOR people also has a chauvinistic component: The ex-KOR members openly criticize the anti-Jewish attitudes among some elements associated with the Church, while the conservatives have directed anti-Jewish remarks at some of Walesa's advisers.⁵ The alienation between the

⁴For example, see the statement by Kornel Morawiecki, head of Solidarnosc Walczaca (Fighting Solidarity), "Narod Przeciw--Walesa Za Komunistami" (The nation against, but Walesa with, the Communists), *Serwis Informacyjny Solidarnosci Walczacej* (underground), June 1989.

⁵At the height of the Carmelite convent controversy, and in response to criticism of Cardinal Glemp by close Walesa advisers, flyers appeared with extremist anti-Semitic comments that claimed, among other

conservatives and ex-KOR elements has grown (helped by the Carmelite convent controversy). For instance, a writer in a Church publication attacked several people close to Walesa using words usually reserved for the Communist party,⁶ while the bitter public feud between the prominent Catholic intellectual Wladyslaw Sila-Nowicki and Walesa's advisers continues unabated (During the elections, Sila-Nowicki chose to run against Jacek Kuron, a founding member of KOR and top adviser to Walesa, and now a minister in the Mazowiecki government; Glemp endorsed Sila-Nowicki just before the election. Glemp also endorsed Adam Michnik's opponent.)

Whether for reasons of nationalist beliefs, personal antipathy and differences over trade union structure, or religiously based convictions, the grouping of radical oppositionists has the potential to unify behind their common resentment of the Walesa-led coalition that is the dominant force in the parliament. The hard core of radical forces is currently outside the formal power structure in Poland, but some radicals' views are shared by some parliament members because the Solidarity-supported bloc of candidates that was elected in June was composed of a wide cross-section of prominent opposition figures. The ad hoc collection of oppositionists who were elected as part of the Solidarity bloc included both reformist Communist party members and conservative intellectuals. As the immediate task of instituting the structures of democratic rule is accomplished, the one unifying thread for the coalition--the desire to overturn the authoritarian one-party system--is disappearing. Disputes about economic and social policies are bound to arise within the parliament; the Solidarity bloc will likely split along ideological lines that will lead to the formation of political parties (a process already under way). In short, a classic scenario of the growth in institutions of interest articulation under a democratic regime is likely. Some of the more conservative members of

things, that Walesa's team was dominated by Jews. *Odglosy*, August 6, 1989.

⁶Tomasz Wolek, "Kultura Polityczna" (Political culture), *Krolowa Apostolow*, September 1989.

parliament probably will look for and find support among the radicals now outside the parliament. In time, some of these conservatives will likely become articulate spokesmen for the radicals' views in the parliament. The radicals may be co-opted into the system in this manner.

In West European political terms, if Walesa's coalition can be thought of currently as a grouping of diverse centrist and left-of-center political organizations led by some prominent social democrats, liberals, and leftist Christian Democrats, then the more radical oppositionist groupings have the potential to coalesce into a predominantly right-of-center coalition led mainly by Christian Democrats. (Soon after the elections, Cardinal Glemp, showing his dissatisfaction with the KOR-dominated social democratic line of Solidarity, openly proposed forming a Christian Democratic party to offset the Solidarity and Communist party structures.) All this is not to say that a two-party system will emerge in Poland. Most likely, at least five major parties and many minor ones will be represented in the Polish parliament within a year, and the overall structure of political divisions in Poland will probably be similar to that of Italy. However, a rough division into two major coalitions is bound to take place in Poland. In the long term, the two coalitions may lose their multiparty composition and each coalesce into one or two party alliances--that is, the situation will move toward one akin to that in the FRG. In the short term--during the next few years--the existence of many parties seems assured.

Assessing the Radicals' Strength. Judging the radical opposition's strength is difficult, though clearly the regime's alarm at the population's radicalization and (according to Rakowski) the mushrooming of "right-wing" organizations in Poland led to the regime's haste in signing the roundtable agreement and holding the elections.⁷ Numerous opposition groups belonging to radical opposition boycotted the June 1989 elections. Of the eligible voters, supposedly 38 percent

⁷Interview with Rakowski, *Nepszabadsag*, March 25, 1989 (translated in *FBIS-EEU*, No. 62, April 3, 1989, p. 29).

(some 9.5 million people) did not vote, though the actual figures may be lower (in the vicinity of 30 percent,⁸ a respectable turnout but still lower than could have been expected by European standards and by the added significance of the first free election since 1947). According to polls conducted by Solidarity, apparently half the people who did not vote did so not because of apathy but because of total alienation from the system and the rejection of any dialogue with the Communists.⁹ This would still leave a hard core of almost four million people who feel no attachment to the system, whether represented by the Communists or by Walesa's Solidarity, and who would be sympathetic to the radical opposition's views. To these should be added several million people who voted, for not all the radical groups advocated a boycott of the elections. For example, KPN, the most prominent group espousing a program more radical than Solidarity, took part in the elections by fielding its own candidates and showed a significant measure of support; although KPN fielded candidates in only half the electoral districts, it won more than 5 percent of the overall vote.¹⁰ Finally, many people who voted did so because of their hatred for the Communists but that motivation does not necessarily translate into support for Walesa's wing of the opposition. All in all, several million people were sympathetic

⁸The State Electoral Commission pointed out that voting lists had not been updated for many years and that people who had died were still on the rolls. Comments by Janina Zakrzewska, professor of constitutional law, *Zycie Warszawy*, October 2, 1989 (translated in *FBIS-EEU*, No. 194, October 10, 1989, pp. 85-87).

⁹Interview with Geremek, *La Repubblica*, June 7, 1989 (translated in *FBIS-EEU*, No. 110, June 9, 1989, p. 43). In a poll conducted by a Solidarity-associated organization, answers to the question "Why did you think there was a relatively low turnout?" revealed that 6.4 percent of respondents thought it was because of the boycott, and 37.0 percent said that voters' distrust of both sides was the reason. See *Gazeta Wyborcza*, June 9-11, 1989. A poll by the official CBOS polling organization asked the same question; the structure of choices was faulty because answers were ambiguous, but 51 percent of respondents' answers could be interpreted to mean distrust either of both sides or of Solidarity only. See *Panorama*, June 25, 1989.

¹⁰A top Solidarity leader, Karol Modzelewski, grudgingly admitted KPN's organizational strength and sizable membership base. See *Tygodnik Kulturalny*, August 16, 1989.

to the radical opposition (as shown by their boycott of the elections or vote for the radical groups); the support for the Walesa coalition by up to ten million people is soft and may be vulnerable to appeals by the radicals.

The age structure of the nonvoters is also important. Most people who did not vote were young. Although youth is notorious for not voting in Western democracies, this phenomenon in Poland's highly politicized atmosphere may indicate a deeper trend of radicalization. During the past few years, the official and the underground press, as well as the Church, have been discussing with alarm trends among youth--the decline of patriotism, massive emigration, widespread antisocial behavior, and youth's overall alienation from the system. Younger workers no longer feel they must heed Walesa's words; Walesa is seen as part of the establishment by the younger workers.¹¹ Resentment also exists among the militant youth elements that student and youth representatives were not invited to the roundtable talks and their concerns were ignored by the communists and by the moderate opposition.¹² According to CBOS polls, more than 40 percent of high school seniors believe that only street demonstrations can make the establishment take youth's concerns seriously, and 60 percent think that street demonstrations are justified.¹³ Some Polish sociologists see the emergence of a "third force" in the radicalized youth.¹⁴ Because of the dismal economic situation and a widespread perception of a lack of prospects for any quick improvements in the standard of living, the generational gap may have evolved into a radicalization gap as well.

¹¹For a discussion of this problem, see Ryszard Stocki, "Młodzież a Solidarność" (Youth and Solidarity), *Tygodnik Powszechny*, July 9, 1989.

¹²Interview with Daniel Chrudzinski, member of the Youth Solidarity group, *Gazeta Wyborcza*, June 22, 1989.

¹³*Nowiny*, August 19-20, 1989.

¹⁴Tadeusz Szawiel and Rafael Zakrzewski, *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, August 29, 1989 (translated in *JPRS-EER*, No. 107, September 22, 1989, pp. 8-10).

Mazowiecki and the Radicals. Walesa's choice of Mazowiecki for prime minister assuaged some of the differences between Walesa's wing and the radicals. No puppet of Walesa, Mazowiecki is respected by virtually all opposition groups for his activity as editor of Solidarity's underground weekly in the 1980s, and his connection with the Church has won him points among the conservatives. In some respects, his stature transcends the divisions within the opposition. The radicals' current attitude toward the government is to wait and see. However, though the radicals wish Mazowiecki well, they are skeptical of his prospects. Marian Jurczyk, a well-known figure from 1980 and currently the leader of an anti-Walesa Solidarity organization in Szczecin, summed up these feelings well:

Tadeusz Mazowiecki has been my dear friend for many years. . . . Unfortunately, my prognoses are not optimistic. . . . I would like to stress that I am not opposed to this government and that it is a step in the right direction. I fear its future for two reasons. First, the outlook among the population has undergone a radicalization, and a societal explosion is unavoidable. . . . Second, the government will not be fully trustworthy; only a trustworthy government can prevent an explosion.¹⁵

The skeptical attitude implies a low threshold of tolerance for the negative side effects of the government's policies. The lukewarm support for Mazowiecki, shared by many important members of Walesa's coalition, is a contributing reason for the widely acknowledged lack of enthusiasm in Poland following Mazowiecki's nomination.¹⁶

¹⁵Comments by Jurczyk, *Gazeta Wyborcza*, August 21, 1989.

¹⁶In a poll conducted by the Polish Radio and Television Committee, answering the question "Do you think Mazowiecki will be a good premier?" 53 percent of the respondents gave the qualified answer of "rather yes," as opposed to the clear-cut "surely yes" given by 23 percent, while 20 percent lacked an opinion. Warsaw PAP in English, September 18, 1989 (published in *FBIS-EEU*, No. 180, September 19, 1989, p. 53). These figures show widespread support, but the support is mixed with caution and uncertainty.

The radicals' opposition has not diminished greatly during the three months Mazowiecki's government has been in power. The radicals acknowledge that the government is "partially ours," but their philosophy eschews compromise. Nationalists and the militant workers feel they have been deceived by the Communists too many times in the past to trust any deals that give the Communists a role in governing the country. In a sign of their total alienation, many radicals greeted the presence of Mazowiecki or Skubiszewski at Warsaw Pact or CMEA meetings with derision. The rapid changes in other East European countries in the fall of 1989 may actually strengthen the radicals' hand, for they may soon be able to claim that Walesa compromised too much by allowing the Communists to enter the coalition. Despite the current uncompromising rejectionist line, some radicals will probably be co-opted into the system as the Solidarity bloc in the parliament falls apart. However, co-optation in favor of participation within the system does not necessarily imply support for the policies of the Mazowiecki government. Also, keeping in mind that a deep chasm between the rulers and the ruled has been a persistent feature in Poland's modern history is important. Even the interwar period, a time of full Polish independence, was marked by a dissonance between the political establishment and much of the society. Because of the chasm, a good portion of the radicals (presumably people who internalized the acceptance of the chasm) probably will refuse to be co-opted. A contributing dynamic to the chasm is the general worker distrust of intellectuals. The worker/intellectual split in Poland was overcome to some extent in 1980, but certain groups of workers only tolerated the intellectuals' help and resented being used for political purposes. The current government is composed largely of intellectuals, a fact that may contribute to the estrangement between radical workers and the government. The polarization in Polish politics will likely continue and will pose a danger to the government's viability, just as the Mazowiecki team implements harsh economic policies that are bound to spark unrest.

The Populists

The other source of potential instability is the appeal of simple solutions and demagoguery. The chief of the officially sanctioned trade unions (the OPZZ), Alfred Miodowicz, has gained some notoriety for his manipulative, emotional, and simplistic appeals to the workers. Although Miodowicz is too discredited by his long-standing association with the regime to achieve a truly mass following, he has managed to carve out a niche of support of his own. In a time when Walesa's team is instituting measures that will financially hurt many workers and the Solidarity trade union membership is hovering at a fairly low level, Miodowicz has deftly exploited the grievances of those negatively affected by the reforms. For various reasons, at least in some regions, Miodowicz's unions have held their own against the relegalized Solidarity trade union structures.¹⁷ As the last closet Stalinist in public life, Miodowicz also appeals to the middle and lower ranks of Communist party members who failed to secure a profitable position for themselves before the change of government and who will now have to worry about their livelihood and face public scorn. The co-optation of this segment of the population (those who collaborated with the Communist regime) into the system is problematic. Indeed, the Miodowicz bloc of remnants of hard-liners and workers swayed by populist appeals against any political authority probably will assume the form of a permanent, significant, fringe opposition. Such a movement can act as a disruptive force and a catalyst for unrest.

Anti-Walesa Solidarity organizations and Miodowicz's trade unions both appeal for support to the same social group, though they do so from different points of view and for different purposes. A formal coalition between the two groupings is unlikely. Whereas Walesa-controlled Solidarity unions have cooperated with OPZZ unions in some locales, the splinter Solidarity groups usually avoid contact with any force tainted by the regime. Nevertheless, a collusion of interests in the short

¹⁷See the series by Ludmila Wolynska, "Solidarnosc--stan na dzisiaj" (Solidarity--its contemporary state), *Gazeta Wyborcza*, July 5, 1989, and July 7-9, 1989.

term--in the sense of only lukewarm support for the government and dislike of some tendencies within it--exists.

The Impact of Internal Opposition on Foreign Policy

The internal forces of opposition identified above are already in place and their dislike (or at least skepticism) of the government is known. The necessary economic policies to be launched massively in 1990 will impact negatively on wide sections of social groups and are likely to produce waves of unrest. Clearly, domestic economic and social policies will be of paramount importance. However, the Mazowiecki government's German and Soviet policies can easily become footballs in the larger political battle between the various forces in Poland.

The German Issue in Polish Politics. The shifting policy toward the Germans is especially touchy for several reasons, but mainly stems from the persistence and continuing vitality of Polish nationalism. Recent polls, as well as softer data, show the continued Polish anti-German bias. In an August 1989 CBOS poll, answering the question "Do you like Germans?" 50 percent of the respondents said no, and only 9 percent said yes.¹⁸ Another poll, taken by Solidarity-associated opinion takers in November 1989, showed that 44 percent of Poles felt aversion or hostility toward the Germans, while 20 percent felt friendly toward them.¹⁹ The anti-German trends have dropped a bit during the past ten years, especially among the youth.²⁰ However, the trend toward a favorable or neutral perception of the Germans has been slow so far and is still a minority view. For example, a writer in an underground publication lamented recently that in a 1988 symposium sponsored by the Young Poland movement (a group on the fringe of moderate forces), the one unifying thread that cut across all age groups and philosophical differences was the fear of Germany.²¹ In October 1989, during a demonstration sponsored by Polish-German Solidarity (a Polish group

¹⁸*Trybuna Ludu*, August 28, 1989.

¹⁹*Gazeta Wyborcza*, November 6, 1989.

²⁰*Zycie Warszawy*, January 25, 1989.

²¹Marian Miszański, "Polacy a Zjednoczenie Niemiec" (Poles and the unification of Germany), *Kurs* (underground), No. 37, November 1988.

formed in support of the reforms in the GDR), the demonstrators encountered a good deal of popular hostility from passersby.²² Given the deeply entrenched fear of Germans in Poland and, simultaneously, the Polish government's desire for closer ties with the FRG, political groupings ill-disposed toward the Mazowiecki government will find rallying people around the slogan of renewed German expansionism easy. This approach will not be important only if the economic situation improves significantly and rapidly, for that is the fundamental determinant of the government's stability.

Several specific factors further complicate the issue. The existence of a German minority in Poland, denied or belittled for so long by the Communists, has finally been acknowledged. The issue is difficult because, in the case of Silesians or Kashubs, there is a long history of double nationality. These Slavic peoples lived in a border area where much intermarriage took place with the Germanic peoples. In addition, the long period of German rule over these areas, accompanied by policies of Germanization, led to the erasure of clear-cut Polish-German cultural differences. The FRG's current policy of recognizing as a German any Pole whose grandparent was of German nationality is open to widely differing interpretations and means that probably every sixth Pole, using liberal genealogical techniques and some imagination, could qualify as a German. Because of the FRG's immigration policy, a massive emigration to the FRG from Poland has occurred during the past ten years as conditions in Poland have deteriorated and as other Western countries have cut down on the number of Polish immigrants they allowed. The fuzziness as to what qualifications to use to describe one's nationality has also led to widely diverging figures on the number of ethnic Germans in Poland; some Polish figures are as low as a few thousand, while spokesmen in the FRG speak of several million. The acknowledgment of the German minority came because of some Solidarity intellectuals' sympathy for the plight of national minorities in Poland and because of pressure from the FRG.

²²PWA, No. 210, October 20, 1989.

The latter source is certainly resented at the mass level. The setting up of cultural centers for ethnic Germans will be an irritant to many Poles. Most important, the ethnic Germans live in western and northern Poland, on territories obtained by Poland as a result of World War II as compensation for the transfer of Polish eastern territories to the USSR. The Germans' increased visibility on territories the Polish Communists have consistently labeled as still questioned by revanchists in the FRG is bound to strike some fears among the residents of the region. Already, an emotional debate in the Polish press has arisen over the founding of a German cultural association in Silesia. The anti-German feelings are only thinly disguised--if at all--in the press, and conflicts are openly predicted. The voivod (governor) of Opole voivodship, summed up the popular feelings:

German pressure is causing a widespread feeling of threat. People tell us: For now, you agree on a minority, and then maybe on moving the borders. And what about us--will there be another moving of populations?²³

A recent CBOS poll showed that 41 percent of Poles still feel a threat from the Germans;²⁴ this feeling is much greater in the ex-German territories than in the old Polish regions.

Anti-German feelings are especially high of late because of the four-year dispute over the territorial sea boundary between Poland and the GDR. The dispute, begun by the GDR's unilateral extension of territorial sea limit to 12 miles, threatened the economic vitality of the northwest (the GDR prevented the deep sea channel to the Swinoujscie-Szczecin port complex from being dredged) and, because of incidents of GDR patrol boats firing upon Polish ships, the dispute became an emotional issue for the Poles, who sometimes called it Szczecin's war with the GDR. The population in the area around Szczecin

²³"Znaczona Karta; po odmowie rejestracji Sozial Kulturelle Gesselschaft Minderheitdeutschen in Schlesien," *Prawo i Zycie*, August 12, 1989.

²⁴*Trybuna Ludu*, August 28, 1989.

is especially sensitive to the threat of German irredentism, for the city itself and a part of the voivodship are actually west of the Oder River. In 1945, the city switched hands back and forth between Polish and German (as part of the Soviet zone of Germany) administrations several times before its ultimate fate was finally decided. Whenever any rumors of German irredentism crop up, Szczecin is the first area to be mentioned.

The makeup of the ex-German region's population is also important. A large portion of the Poles who settled in the ex-German territories after World War II came from the eastern Polish territories that had been incorporated into the USSR. Their anti-Communist, anti-Russian, nationalist, peasant outlooks made the region the most difficult for the communists to control (for example, Szczecin workers attacked the Soviet consulate there in 1956 and were the most militant--and among the first--strikers in 1970 and in 1980); continued greater political volatility in western and northern Poland is likely.

Finally, the main centers of anti-Walesa Solidarity splinter groups are in western Poland--specifically, Szczecin and Wroclaw. Leaders of these splinter groups are nationally known and possess some charismatic appeal.

Evidence that the population of western Poland tends to be less compromising and more alienated appears in an analysis of the geographical distribution of voter turnout ratios during the June elections. Patterns of voter turnout were clearly different in the ex-German territories than in the rest of Poland. Whereas turnouts of 65 percent or more (and often above 70 percent) were the norm in most of the old Polish regions, turnouts of less than 65 percent (and often below 60 percent) were the norm in western and northern areas.²⁵ The lower turnouts are geographically correlated with the anti-Walesa strongholds and the more militant strata of the Polish workers.

²⁵Some Solidarity sociologists interpret these findings differently, but the geographical difference in distribution is hard to miss. *Gazeta Wyborcza*, June 16-18, 1989.

Leaders of the Polish and the FRG governments have recognized the touchy nature of Polish-German relations and taken steps not to inflame the Polish-German animosity unnecessarily. Solidarity intellectuals are aware of the potential political capital that radical Polish political forces could reap from discussions of the Oder/Neisse border in the FRG and have asked visiting statesmen from the FRG to keep such debates in check.²⁶ The Kohl government, for the purposes of its own inter-German policy, is keenly interested in Polish reforms, and top advisers to Kohl genuinely seem to be striving for a lasting Polish-German reconciliation. Thus, politicians in the FRG have been careful so far not to provoke Polish feelings, as evidenced by Kohl's decision to change his mind about attending a German mass at a symbolically controversial place in Poland during his November 1989 visit. How long the self-imposed limits on discussion of the ex-German lands in the FRG can last is debatable. The Republikaners and some CSU elements are bound to raise the issue as they have done regularly in the past.

A whole range of irritants can mar progress in Polish-FRG relations. For example, officials from the FRG have insisted on using German place-names for Polish towns (for example, Breslau rather than Wroclaw) in the German texts of agreements on aid and on expanding the teaching of German in schools. Another irritant is the common practice for Germans in the FRG and the GDR of using the term *East Germany* to describe the ex-German Polish territories. Since in all other countries the term *East Germany* is used to refer to the GDR, the different custom has a definite irredentist ring to Polish ears. Such issues may be solved or simply accepted, but they are irritants because many Poles are leery of German power and are hypersensitive to any slights (real or imagined) from the Germans.

The FRG's policy of improving the lot of ethnic Germans in Poland is potentially explosive, for it opens the possibility of a minority ethnic group living at a higher standard than the dominant ethnic group.

²⁶See Geremek's comments to SPD leader Hans-Jochen Vogel. Hamburg DPA in German, October 11, 1989 (translated in *FBIS-EEU*, No. 197, October 13, 1989, pp. 48-49).

Some persistent rumors that aid and investment from the FRG will be concentrated in the ex-German territories of Poland evoke similar prospects. Whether as a result of FRG policies or for local reasons, friction between some true ethnic Germans and Poles could lead to ugly incidents (reminiscent of the Carmelite convent controversy) that would complicate relations between Poland and the FRG and lead to debates in the FRG parliament about linking Polish aid to other issues. This, in turn, would only lead to more animosity on the Polish side since many Poles remain convinced that the Germans owe them reparations and aid for moral reasons, just like the FRG's reparations to Israel.²⁷

The Soviet Issue in Polish Politics. The Mazowiecki government is vulnerable to attacks on its Soviet policy for not going fast enough to distance itself from the USSR. A formal withdrawal of (for example) Hungary from the Warsaw Pact could be a catalyst in this respect, for pressure would build upon the Mazowiecki government from the radical groupings to follow Hungary's footsteps. The issue of Soviet troops in Poland is not a major problem yet because of the small number of Soviet troops and their relative isolation, but it could be exploited for political expediency. Recently, problems connected with the Soviet troops stationed in Poland have been discussed in the parliament.²⁸ In an attempt to control the spread of such debates, Polish military spokesmen have been quite forthcoming with explanations.²⁹ The coming reductions in Soviet troops in Poland as part of the conventional arms control talks will be welcomed. The reductions should also reduce popular pressure on the Polish government to follow suit if all Soviet troops are withdrawn from Hungary. However, if Soviet troops are

²⁷A CBOS poll showed that 55 percent of Poles think the FRG is morally responsible to aid Poland economically. *Trybuna Ludu*, August 28, 1989. The FRG acknowledged its debt to Poland by paying reparations in the 1970s, but much of the German reparations was lost to corruption on the part of high Polish Communist party officials.

²⁸See Minister of Defense Florian Siwicki's testimony at a parliamentary session on August 2, 1989 (Warsaw Domestic Service, in Polish, 0830 GMT, August 2, 1989 [translated in *FBIS-EEU*, No. 149, August 4, 1989, pp. 21-24]).

²⁹*Polityka*, July 8, 1989 (translated in *FBIS-EEU*, No. 136, July 18, 1989, pp. 23-26).

withdrawn completely from Czechoslovakia, the Mazowiecki government will likely encounter pressure to negotiate a full Soviet withdrawal from Poland.

Another possible problem may be the prevalent notion among the Poles that Polish-Soviet economic relations are unfair to the Poles. Although the notion is factually wrong at the macroeconomic level,³⁰ many cases of disadvantageous deals at the level of individual factories undoubtedly exist. Mazowiecki's principled but cautious policy toward the Soviets, combined with economic difficulties, could result in politically motivated charges by the radicals that the government has not changed enough in its attitude toward the USSR and that it has continued to allow Poland to be "exploited" economically by the Soviets. Exposés of unfair dealings in Hungarian-Soviet economic relations already have surfaced in Hungary and incidences of specific Soviet advantages in economic dealings with Poland are bound to be reported in the Polish press (such exposés came out previously in 1980-1981). The net effect will be to strengthen the Poles' resentment toward the Soviets at the popular level. Finally, the whole issue of Soviet responsibility for imposing their economic system on Poland--a system that has led to a disastrous situation--is a fertile area for demagogues.

An Overall Assessment

Because of the Soviet reforms, anti-Soviet feelings seem to have diminished; although anti-Soviet demonstrations took place in virtually all major Polish cities in 1989, the turnout for the demonstrations was small and limited mainly to fringe youth groups. During the next year or two, if the Soviet reformist line continues and the Soviets continue to disengage from Eastern Europe, anti-Soviet (and anti-Russian) sentiments will probably not be as good a topic to exploit for political purposes as anti-German sentiments--if only because Polish relations

³⁰For the extent of Soviet subsidization of Eastern Europe during the last two decades, see Keith Crane, *The Soviet Economic Dilemma of Eastern Europe*, The RAND Corporation, R-3368-AF, May 1986.

toward the USSR have evolved from dependency to autonomy, and thus have flowed with the current of Polish mass perceptions and popular wishes. However, Mazowiecki's German policy is going against some deeply held prejudices and will likely be controversial. To put it differently, a feeling of triumph accompanies the reduction of Soviet leverage over Poland, but a sense of fear and uncertainty accompanies the increase in Polish interaction with the FRG. The uncertainty is strengthened by the increasingly very real specter of German reunification. Mieczyslaw Rakowski, the Communist party first secretary, has already tried to build some political support by questioning top Solidarity officials' pronouncements about the FRG³¹ and by couching his support for the GDR's existence with cynical appeals to Polish nationalism.³² Since the changes in the GDR, Walesa too has cautioned that efforts toward German reunification should not be pushed too quickly.³³ In a telling comment that revealed the feelings of many Poles, Walesa reportedly spoke against quick German reunification and told Israeli Vice Prime Minister Shim'on Peres that the Germans "must not be allowed again to destroy Europe."³⁴

Popular reaction to Mazowiecki's foreign policy moves will be one determinant of Polish foreign policy's success. In turn, various prejudices and resentments, based on Polish nationalism and directed against Poland's most important neighboring countries, can easily become topics of domestic debates that could influence the government's foreign policy moves.

³¹Speech by Mieczyslaw Rakowski, *Trybuna Ludu*, September 20, 1989 (translated in *FBIS-EEU*, No. 184, September 25, 1989, pp. 43-46).

³²Interview with Rakowski, Warsaw Television Service, in Polish, 1900 GMT, October 9, 1989 (translated in *FBIS-EEU*, No. 195, October 11, 1989, pp. 68-69).

³³Interview with Walesa, *Bild am Sonntag*, November 4, 1989.

³⁴Jerusalem Domestic Service, in Hebrew, 1800 GMT, November 29, 1989 (as translated in *FBIS-EEU*, No. 231, December 4, 1989, p. 68).

EXTERNAL SOURCES OF FRICTION

Although the main sources of challenges to Polish foreign policy are internal, some external sources of potential problems for the Polish government exist. The Mazowiecki government's emphasis on human rights abroad, stemming from the genuine conviction among Polish opposition intellectuals that reforms in Eastern Europe are indivisible, may become a problem. In practice, the view amounts to the acceptance of common bonds with the opposition groups throughout Eastern Europe. Polish spokesmen issued conflicting statements on this topic. On the one hand, Mazowiecki acknowledged that contacts with the opposition groups in other East European countries would be established,³⁵ but then he also denied any Polish intention of destabilizing the regimes in neighboring countries. In terms of actual behavior, actions of Polish senators and articles in the independent daily *Gazeta Wyborcza* in the summer and fall of 1989 in effect amounted to open agitation for change in the GDR and Czechoslovakia.³⁶ Since the changes in other East European countries in the fall of 1989, the issue of Polish interference has been less salient. However, similar Polish meddling in Soviet affairs may become annoying to the Gorbachev leadership. Because of the reforms in the USSR, Polish support for greater rights of Soviet nationalities has not been a problem so far, but the Polish sympathy and support for nationalist forces in the Baltic republics, Ukraine, Belorussia, and Moldavia is almost certain to become irritating to the Soviet leadership if the central authorities attempt to curtail the spread of further

³⁵Interview with Mazowiecki, Budapest Television Service, in Hungarian, August 27, 1989 (translated in *FBIS-EEU*, No. 165, August 28, 1989, p. 33); Mazowiecki's news conference, Warsaw Television Service, in Polish, August 24, 1989 (translated in *FBIS-EEU*, No. 164, August 25, 1989, p. 37).

³⁶During a visit in July 1989 to Czechoslovakia by members of the Polish parliament, the Poles met Czechoslovak opposition figures (including Václav Havel and Alexander Dubček). The Poles' actions were denounced as interference in Czechoslovak internal affairs. *Rude Pravo*, July 28, 1989 (translated in *FBIS-EEU*, No. 147, August 2, 1989, p. 21). Also see the interview with Wolfgang Templin, member of the GDR's Initiative for Peace and Human Rights opposition group, *Gazeta Wyborcza*, September 12, 1989 (translated in *FBIS-EEU*, No. 179, September 18, 1989, pp. 37-38).

nationalist demands. The ties between Solidarity and the reformist Interregional Group of Deputies, as well as specific ties with individuals such as Boris Yeltsin or Yurii Afanasyev, may also prove annoying to the Soviet leadership if the reformists become increasingly impatient with Gorbachev's pace of reforms. Similarly, Polish support for striking Soviet workers may prove irritating to the Moscow leadership.

Regional Soviet authorities in the Ukraine must be concerned about a spillover of Polish influence. Some evidence exists that Ukrainian party and KGB officials may have tried to discredit the militant wing of the Ukrainian nationalist movement by linking it to the Poles.³⁷ Michnik's calls for a free and independent Ukraine at the Rukh (reformist and nationalist Ukrainian group like national fronts in other republics) meeting in September 1989 could not have made the Ukrainian party apparat happy. The Ukraine's importance to the central government in Moscow makes the Polish meddling particularly touchy.

Aside from this, potential for conflict exists over the issue of ethnic Poles in the USSR. In a reversal of the Polish-German situation, Polish efforts to assist their kinsmen in the USSR may become a problem for Soviet authorities, mainly at the republic level but also at the union level. Polish-Lithuanian relations are already strained over the Polish minority situation in Lithuania; if the Polish government presses openly for the restoration of Polish *oblasts* in the Ukraine and in Byelorussia (these *oblasts* were dissolved on Stalin's orders in the mid-1930s), relations between Poland and the other Soviet republics bordering Polish territory may become similarly strained.

The interest and involvement of the Polish opposition's pragmatic wing in the USSR's internal events are motivated by humanitarian considerations and perceived self-interest. However, the nationalistically based messianic view of Poland survives in the more radically inclined elements within the Polish opposition. This view sees Poland as a spark that ignites the nations forcefully incorporated

³⁷Alexander J. Motyl, "Policing Perestroika: The Indispensable KGB," *The Harriman Institute Forum*, Vol. 2, No. 8, August 1989.

into the USSR against Soviet rule and Russian domination. The issue is touchy, the dividing line between the opposition groups is unclear, and the problem has been a subject of polemics within the opposition.³⁸ In addition, support for ethnic Poles in the USSR cuts across the ideological lines within the opposition.

Polish Jacobinlike activism contains seeds of discord, and Rakowski has already warned of its potentially harmful consequences.³⁹ Nor will the Polish government for certain be able to curtail Polish activism in response to Soviet displeasure. Some Polish intellectuals who have been active in spreading the reformist line abroad do not have any official positions within the Polish government, yet they are among the most respected figures in Poland. In the relaxed internal conditions of contemporary Poland, the government will be unable to stop communication between private citizens. The problem becomes even more difficult as the ties between Poles and the various national fronts proliferate.

³⁸For example, one activist spoke up against this current of radicalism within the Young Poland movement. See Jacek Bartyzel, "Do Przyjaciol z 'Polityki Polskiej': List Otwarty w Kwestii Rosyjskiej" (To friends from "Polityka Polska": An open letter on the Russian question), *Polityka Polska* (underground), No. 12, 1989.

³⁹See Rakowski's speech, *Trybuna Ludu*, September 20, 1989 (translated in *FBIS-EEU*, No. 184, September 25, 1989, pp. 43-46).

VII. A MULTILATERAL SOLUTION?

The underlying motive for Poland's attempt to establish a new *modus vivendi* with the USSR and with the Germans is its reintegration into the main body of Europe. Although full reintegration is unachievable without German goodwill or in the face of Soviet hostility, Polish foreign policy envisages an opening to the West as a whole; Poland's future place in Europe does not depend on its two neighbors alone. Regional or Europeanwide approaches to breaking the division of Europe provide alternatives to dependence on the Germans while also offering a structured process of change that would assuage Soviet fears.

Western European economic organizations provide one mechanism that could assist Poland's reintegration into Europe. The European Economic Community (EEC) is unlikely to debate seriously the idea of Polish membership for quite some time because of the Polish economy's relative underdevelopment and because of its current focus on "deepening." Although full membership will probably not be extended to Poland before 2000, some form of more developed associate status is likely within a few years. As Austria moves toward full EEC membership, the precedent for enlarging the EEC to include neutral central European states will be established, opening the way to further enlargement of the organization. In the immediate future, the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) will probably be the first West European economic association Poland will join. Skubiszewski has announced that Poland intends to apply for EFTA membership.¹ The rather cool reception that has greeted the request will likely change soon. In January 1990, Sweden will take over the EFTA chairmanship. Swedish government spokesmen have promised a more active EFTA policy toward Eastern Europe. So far, EFTA spokesmen have raised the possibility of Hungarian membership after 1993,² but this cautious

¹*Aftenposten*, November 16, 1989 (translated in *FBIS-WEU*, No. 229, November 30, 1989, p. 23).

²*Der Standard*, December 13, 1989 (translated in *FBIS-WEU*, No. 239, December 14, 1989, p. 3).

attitude is bound to change as Eastern Europe continues its rapid pace toward democratization and neutrality. Full membership in EFTA is not necessary for Poland to reap benefits from the association. A free trade agreement with EFTA (such as the one already proposed by Hungary) would ease trade with Western Europe and be virtually identical to EFTA membership. Some form of Polish association with EEC or EFTA would provide a mechanism through which a greater measure of Polish economic reintegration into the main body of Europe would be accomplished.

Politically, the CSCE (Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe) process, codified in Helsinki in 1975, may become a useful tool in creating a framework for Eastern Europe's transition toward sovereign, democratic states integrated into the main body of Europe. As an all-European process that has consistently attempted to supersede the division of Europe into blocs, it may moderate any emerging conflicts on the continent and assist the democratization of Eastern Europe. The CSCE was an important institution for generating cracks in the Warsaw Pact in the 1970s and for lowering tensions in the 1980s. The rapid pace of change in Eastern Europe during the second half of 1989 means that the CSCE will have to transform itself into a much more dynamic institution to be effective in the future. Whether the CSCE is capable of adapting to the new circumstances is uncertain. However, the East Europeans--and Poles specifically--are likely to make use of the Helsinki process to ensure the changes won so far in furthering reform in the USSR and in using the CSCE as another channel to the West.

Finally, there is the possibility of regional groupings that would locally break down the old ideological divides. The Alpe-Adria grouping (consisting of parts of the FRG, Austria, Hungary, Yugoslavia, and Italy) is an example of institutionalized regional integration that is a useful first step on the road toward greater European integration. In this vein, the concept of a grouping of democratic, sovereign states of East-Central Europe (Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary), reminiscent of Tomas Masaryk's formulation of Central Europe, may yet come true. A sense of sympathy and shared values and goals, stemming from contacts established before 1989, exists among Polish, Czechoslovak, and

Hungarian opposition figures. These opposition figures have now assumed power (or are about to assume power). The sympathy across the borders and the realization that all three countries are engaged in the same task (building viable democracies with predominantly market economies) may put a stop to the cycle of conflicts over territory or the treatment of ethnic minorities that bedeviled pre-World War II Polish-Czechoslovak and Hungarian-Czechoslovak relations. Genuine guarantees of freedom of travel and speech in all three countries are also bound to reduce old conflicts in the same way such squabbles diminished in Western Europe after World War II. Greater cooperation among the three countries will mean a more rational division of labor in the region and greater bargaining power with the West. In the case of Poland and Czechoslovakia, the common concern regarding German irredentism and the impending German reunification may finally lead to a confederation of Western Slavs.

As the overall reduction in East-West tensions reduces the difficulty of the Polish dilemma, the multilateralization of Polish approaches to the West (either through Europeanwide or regional channels) offers a possible way to diminish the Polish dilemma's scope. Reintegration into the main body of Europe and the establishment of close political and economic relations with the major powers on the continent (Italy, France, and the United Kingdom) and with the European neutral bloc would limit the political impact of increased German influence in Poland. Such diversification of Polish attempts to reach out to the West is constrained by geography and the political realities in Europe but will likely be used to the maximum by the Polish government. Moreover, these steps do not pose any domestic political difficulties for either side since they are not controversial either in Poland or in the West. Indeed, a good deal of goodwill toward Poland exists in Italy and France especially. The multilateralization of the Polish opening to the West does not mean that the Soviets and the Germans will cease to be the most important international actors from the Polish perspective. However, they will not be the only ones.

VIII. CONCLUSION

Redemocratization in Poland means the rediscovery of politics. The splits within the opposition into the rough groupings of moderates and radicals were overshadowed when both groupings opposed the greater problem of the Communist party-dominated state. However, with the Communists progressively being reduced to insignificance, splits within the opposition have emerged and are bound to become important in Polish politics. The radical opposition is resentful of the moderate coalition centered around Walesa and will likely become an important voice of opposition to the Mazowiecki government as the latter implements far-reaching economic reforms. Much of the population is fearful of the reforms' negative effects, and the radical opposition will gain the sympathy of many people who lose out in the process of reform.

Foreign policy--specifically, Polish relations with the Germans and with the USSR--is an important component of the Polish internal transformation. The government is vulnerable to criticism on both its Soviet and German policies. The combination of the geographical concentration in western Poland of the Polish population elements least favorably disposed toward the moderates, the recent heightened sense of anti-German feelings because of the dispute over the Bay of Pomerania, and the history of militancy in the region's population is potentially troublesome. The politically disruptive potential of these forces is strengthened by the continued vitality of Polish nationalism with its xenophobic aspects. As the shift toward the normalization of relations with the FRG proceeds and the influence of the FRG in Poland grows, Polish fears of German irredentism may be raised; these fears probably will be greatest in western Poland. The radical opposition may exploit these fears for its own purposes, especially since the government's economic policies may make many people sympathetic to the radicals' views. Populists can also be expected to jump on the bandwagon and criticize Mazowiecki's shift toward the FRG. The impact of simple appeals to nationalism during economic readjustment should not be underestimated.

Although the government's German policy is well thought-out and would benefit the Poles were it implemented, it goes against some deeply entrenched prejudices and raises fears among the Poles. The German issue will undoubtedly be an important factor in Polish politics during the next few years as the GDR's future becomes increasingly uncertain and the immediacy of a German confederation or even reunification becomes a realistic prospect. The Polish government's ability to enact its policy toward the FRG will be sorely tested under such circumstances.

The Soviet policy is also controversial; the Polish government can become the target of politically motivated nationalistic appeals. As Soviet power in Eastern Europe recedes and as other countries, such as Hungary, take steps toward neutrality, the Mazowiecki government will be put under greater popular pressure to further sever its links with the USSR. However, even if the Soviets agree to the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, the pressure in Poland for a unilateral denunciation of the Polish-Soviet bilateral security treaty may provoke a negative Soviet reaction. Independent of this, Polish meddling in Soviet affairs could easily become irritating to the Soviets. In both cases, Soviet tolerance for Polish reforms may wear thin as even the nonideologically viewed security foundations of the Soviet state begin to look threatened. In response, Soviet actions, such as reducing the quantity of oil supplied to Poland, would have a destabilizing effect and would weaken the Polish reform process.

The Mazowiecki government's foreign policy could become a divisive issue in Poland at a time when the government will need to marshal all available support to push through the economic reforms. Success of the Polish transition is far from assured. A stable democracy and a booming economy may actually emerge from the current situation, but a rudimentary, unbalanced market economy with a chaotic democracy (many parties, revolving and unstable governments), or even a succession of civilian and military governments, is an alternative that may also be in Poland's future. In either case, successful implementation of the Mazowiecki government's foreign policy will play an important role in deciding the outcome.